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Preface 
 
Mind the gap… The sweet singsong voice loomed over the speakers as I dragged my suitcases 
into the tube. Exhausted after a tedious journey I squeezed into a vacant seat between two 
serious looking businessmen, both with solemn faces, grey suites, and the smell of old tea and 
dry biscuits lingering in their presence. As the doors snapped the buzz of Heathrow Airport 
out, the reality hit me – London. Caught by the alluring prospect of academic autonomy and a 
world bustling of intriguing knowledge, I had chosen to spend my next five months in London 
so as to write my master thesis. Not only does the city tempt with a leading university of 
education and a breathtaking educational library; England can also coax with prevailing 
projects on the subject of educational neuroscience – the topic of my impending master 
thesis.  
 
Educational neuroscience caught my attention a couple of years ago, when I took a course in 
neuroscience at my home university. The neuroscience course itself had nothing to do with 
education. In fact; I was the only educationist in the entire class and my professor repeatedly 
wondered how a social science student such as myself, had managed to stumble into “this 
field of study”. At the time it was the wonders of the remarkable brain which enthralled me; 
later, however, it became the wonders of the „two cultures‟ which captivated my curiosity. For 
these reasons I started searching for litterateur on the topic, and by the time the writing of my 
master thesis loomed in the horizon, my focus of attention had settled on the debate of the 
linkage between education and cognitive neuroscience. However, it soon became clear that 
there was not much literature as regard educational neuroscience in Norway. To ensure an 
academic adequacy I thus felt it apposite to seek more information abroad.  
 
The previous enthralling rationalities for my choice to study educational neuroscience abroad 
were, however, faltering as the foggy landscape whooshed past the stained tube windows. In 
front of me lay not only the vast city of London; ahead were also an unwritten master thesis 
which unknown depths I did not even dare think about. As the tube sped ahead, my suitcases 
wobbled vigorously in the corner of the carriage. Like two overfed rhinos they stood – 
stuffed, as they were, with warm clothes my mum had forced on me, the fire-detector my dad 
had given me strict instructs to install in my new flat, my sister‟s emergency provisions on 
Norwegian chocolate, my friends wishes, and my tutor‟s words of wisdom. The semester had 
barely begun, and already I felt the need to clutch to this serene kindness and wonderful 
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wishes as if they were a life buoy. I did not know it then, but this support – given from many 
miles away – did indeed help me to keep my head above water in the forthcoming months. 
Especially have my mum‟s comforting words, my dad‟s encouragement, and advices given 
from my tutor, Nina Volckmar, guided me through this academic maze.   
 
As the tube came to a halt in Bloomsbury, I could not help letting a smile dance over my face. 
The venture ahead was indeed unknown, but again, that is the beauty of the alluring future. 
The discourse of educational neuroscience seemed like a mountain, albeit, a mountain 
apposite to be crossed. As the singsong voice once again asked me to „mind the gap‟, I clung 
on to my pack of rhinos. The scene we made were definitely not as pleasing to the eye as 
Hannibal Barca and his herd at the foot of the Alps, albeit, I gave it an honest try (the prospect 
to elegantly maneuver two suitcases out of a wagon holds its limitations).  
 
Cautiously we stomped out of the tube… 
 
 
 
 
 
London, April 25
th
 2011, 
Fride Røe Flobakk 
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1. Introduction  
At the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century we entered what commonly have been known as „the 
Knowledge Age‟, an era conceding knowledge as a significant capital for national economic 
and societal growth (Geake, 2005). The last decades have also been labelled under another 
name; the decades of the brain
1
 (Ansari, Coch & DeSmedt, 2011). „The decades of the brain‟ 
commenced, by and large, with the burgeoning availability of innovative technologies – 
technologies which made it possible to scientifically observe structures and mechanism of the 
human brain previously „hidden‟ from scientific observations (Howard-Jones, 2007). Since 
the late 90‟s, numerous neuroscientific findings have thus been postulated and our 
understanding of how the brain works is continuously increasing. Innovative neuroscientific 
researches have furthermore caught genuine interest to politicians and to the society at large. 
This curiosity is evident in everything from medias focus on scientific results, the growing 
amount of popular scientific books on how the brain works (Ansari et al., 2011), and 
politicians demand for scientific based practices (OECD 2007a; Meld. St. 19, 2009-2010). 
Fascination of the brain has also commenced in academia, making numerous scientists from 
different scholastic disciplines pore with curiosity over neuroscientific reports. In medicine, 
for instance, cognitive neuroscientific findings have lead to significant enhancements. Even 
academics from different social sciences have found aid in neuroscience. Psychology might 
be the field which most commonly is perceived interlinked with cognitive neuroscience, but 
also disciplines such as economic (i.e. neuroeconomics), communication, political science, 
and sociology make use of neuroscientific studies (Varma, McCandliss, & Schwartz, 2008).  
 
One would expect that findings on how the human brain works would be of highly interest 
also amongst educational academics. That is, however, not the case. Lack of notice is 
surprising due to pressure the „Age of Knowledge‟ indirectly puts on educational institutions, 
as politicians constantly stress the importance of improved (and scientifically based) teaching. 
Lack of interest is also unexpected seeing that the entire nature of education is anchored in 
our ability to learn – a facet one ought to think were profoundly linked to studies on how the 
brain works (Geake, 2011). Insofar numerous educational theories are indeed built upon 
cognitive models (e.g. those of Piaget and Vygotsky), but these models can be seen based on 
hypothesis of the mind. The problem, however, is that many of these hypotheses of the mind 
                                                          
1
 It was the U.S. government who designated the 1990’s as “The Decade of the Brain” – the idiom became, 
almost immediately, a catchphrase (Varma, McCandliss, & Schwartz, 2008).  
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have been altered due to innovative neuroscientific studies on the brain (Varma et al., 2008). 
Regardless, cognitive neuroscience does not seem to catch the attention to educationists. 
 
In the vast mountains of educational policy, curriculum and outcomes documentation, there has been, 
until very recently, no mention of the human brain, the organ most central to the educational enterprise. 
It is as though education has been regarded as having little to do with how learning actually take place 
in the brains of students (Geake, 2011 p.44).  
 
Numerous educational academics are, however, shifting their position and several have started 
advocating for benefits connecting education with recent findings on how the brain works. As 
a consequence of this shift, new educational research is initiated; “a new area of research that 
is coming to be known as educational neuroscience” (Patten & Campbell, 2011 p.1)2.  
 
Educational neuroscience as a scholastic discipline aims to connect cognitive neuroscience 
with education; albeit reciprocated collaboration is highly stressed so that one discipline is not 
reduced under instruct from the other. In his latest article Campbell (2011) offers a specific 
definition, stating that “educational neuroscience [is] an area of educational research that 
draws on, as being informed by, theories, methods, and results from the neuroscience, but 
unlike an applied cognitive neuroscience, is not restricted to them” (p.8). The aim is, as it is 
commonly entitled, to “bridge the gap” between education on one side and cognitive 
neuroscience on the other (Bruer, 1997).
3
  
 
With this transdisciplinary endeavour as a focal core, educational neuroscience has become 
prominent in education. Not only is it relevant as regards eminent educational issues of 
theoretical, methodical, philosophical, and practical value; educational neuroscience is also 
highly relevant as to current political and societal concerns (Geake, 2005). Subsequently, one 
can detect increased international interest on the topic. Scientific articles on educational 
neuroscience are mounting, numerous transdisciplinary collaborations are founded, and 
significant project on the topic has been initiated (e.g. OECD (2007b) and TLRP/EDRC
4
 
(Howard-Jones, 2007)). Traces of this novel field of study can also be found in Norway. Even 
if the term „educational neuroscience‟ not yet has been established as a familiar idiom 
                                                          
2
 Even if this transdisciplinary aim has, to some extent, been given different names (‘educational neuroscience’ 
and ‘neuroeducation’ being the most used in the UK; whilst ‘Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE)’ mostly is used 
in the U.S.), this thesis will hence forth refer to the discipline as ‘educational neuroscience’. 
3
 It appears that the metaphor ‘bridging of the gap’ has been eminent in the educational neuroscience debate 
since John Bruer’s (1997) notable article ‘Educational and the Brain: A Bridge Too Far?’. This thesis will continue 
using this metaphor, seeing the idiom’s prominence and frequency in the debate. 
4
 The report ‘Neuroscience and Education; Issues and Opportunities’ were authored by Paul Howard-Jones on 
behalf of Teaching & Learning Research Programme and Economic & Social Research Council.  
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amongst Norwegian academics and politicians, aspects of the international debate are evident. 
Insofar these outlines have mainly been manifested in educational policy documents (e.g. in 
Meld. St. 19, 2009-2010), in the debate on evidence-based education
5
, and the establishment 
of NAFOL and „Programme for Educational Research‟ (i.e. „Utdanning 2020‟). Even if this 
only is fragments of an international trend, there is reason to believe that the debate on 
educational neuroscience soon will reach Norway with a bigger vigor than up to date
6
.  
 
Educational neuroscience‟s expansion, both nationally and internationally, notwithstanding; 
the discipline‟s road has been, and is still, covered with both petals and thorns. Even if 
numerous academics advocate for the endeavour to “bridge the gap” between education and 
neuroscience, this venture has also met ambivalent feelings, even reluctance, amongst some 
educationists. At present, a profound international debate takes place in academic circles and 
different camps bicker on benefits, problems, possibilities, and dangers regarding educational 
neuroscience. First we have advocates who cautious claim that educational neuroscience can 
contribute to vital advances in educational theory, practice and policy. Then we have the more 
hesitant camp who acknowledge the importance to connect neuroscientific findings with 
education, but they do not think the discipline of educational neuroscience sufficient can link 
the two fields together – it is “a bridge too far” (Bruer, 1997). Thirdly one have sceptics who 
argue that connections between the two are downright impossible due to profound differences 
between the field of neuroscience and the one of education – „the gap‟ should therefore not be 
crossed at all (Willingham, 2009). A forth group which can be found in the dispute is a group 
eagerly leaping „the gap‟ in one swift jump, as they enthusiastically make business selling 
neuromyths and so called „brain-based teaching programs‟ to ignorant teachers. What is more, 
and what makes this debate even more intriguing, is that this debate can be seen interlinked 
with more profound and deep-rooted disputes in academia. This underlying dispute is the 
eminent conflict between natural science and social science; the “two proud kingdoms lying 
alongside in chaste self-sufficiency ... Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension – 
sometimes … hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding” (Snow, 1959 p.4f). 
 
Educational neuroscience, and the ongoing debate as regards, makes a fascinating subject for 
analysis and interpretation. Not only is the topic of current interest amongst international 
                                                          
5
 Requests for evidence-based education, e.g. from OECD (2007a), must not be misinterpreted as demands for 
universal classroom formulas, but rather requests for more scientifically grounded approaches to learning 
(Ogden, 2008). 
6
 Read more p.18.  
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politicians and educational academics; the debate on educational neuroscience also 
encompasses an entangled web of ideologies and conflicts worth further scrutinising – an 
undertaking this master thesis modestly attempt to take. The research question is, as follow; 
 
Which discoursive positions, ideologies, conflicts, and interdiscoursive connections can one locate in the 
debate on educational neuroscience?  
 
By answering this question, the thesis aims to elucidate on both the academic discipline of 
educational neuroscience and the international debate as regards the „bridging of the gap‟ 
– „gap-ambiguities‟ which moreover implies both discoursive and interdiscoursive aspects. It 
must further be stressed that the aim of this thesis is neither to explicate on educational 
neuroscientific classroom practice, nor to offer a content review on arguments being voiced. 
These restrictions are due the fact that I am no expert on neuroscience. My field of study is 
education, and it is from an educational standpoint this thesis is written. Besides, the limited 
scope a master thesis holds is further restricting a well-founded elaboration on explicit 
examples on how neuroscientific findings are fused with educational theories and practice. 
Focus in this thesis will thus largely be restricted to the discourse of educational neuroscience, 
and focal aspirations will be to elucidate underlying structures and issues; Why do we find a 
resolute reluctance amongst some educational academics to take novel knowledge of the brain 
into consideration? What do the „problems of the gap‟ encompass? Can these conflicts 
derivate from a more profound interdiscursive ambivalence seeping through the core of the 
overarching scholastic discourse? And last, have we become trapped in our discourse and 
subsequently fallen victims to our own illusions?  
 
Considering this thesis aim to elaborate upon structures embedded in the educational 
neuroscience debate, a critical discourse analysis can be seen as an adequate theoretical and 
methodological approach. The method might be profitable since ”[t]he aim of the discourse 
analysis is not to prove which of these readings is correct but to consider them all as evidence 
of the text‟s inherent ideological ambiguities, distortions and absences” (Codd in McCulloch, 
2004 p.47). It is therefore not a review of educational neuroscience, as such, but a critical 
analytical approach aiming to illuminate dominant representations, ideologies, hegemonic 
struggles, power relation, interdiscoursive entanglement, and aspects of discoursive change in 
educational neuroscience. This methodological framework can find beneficial aid in 
discoursive theories derived from both Foucault (1970; 1972) and Fairclough (1992). A more 
throughout elaboration on methods and theories will be provided in the next chapter, followed 
by a chapter where educational neuroscience is attempted placed in a historical perspective. 
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Following this, a brief outline of the different discoursive positions in the debate is offered, 
before educational neuroscience will be attempted associated with interdiscoursive facets. The 
last aspect assessed will be to critically consider the role of language in the discourse of 
educational neuroscience. My endeavour is to provide a brief overview – an introduction, as 
such – to the emerging discipline of educational neuroscience.  
 
2. Critical Discourse Analysis  
This master thesis‟ aim is to elucidate the subject of educational neuroscience. A clarification 
of such a topic can be achieved using numerous different methodological approaches; 
different approaches which often look at a topic from different perspectives. Educational 
neuroscience is a relative new discipline in academia and has, insofar, mainly become visible 
as an international academic debate. Different viewpoints, arguments, and ideologies are thus 
easily detectable. Moreover, the international debate on educational neuroscience can be 
linked to both political trends and trends in the society, in addition to more profound conflicts 
in academia (Geake, 2005). To review and analyse such aspects and structures, the method of 
critical discourse analysis can be of profitable use. As a means to establish a theoretical and 
methodical foundation for this thesis, this chapter will attempt elucidating on the concept of 
discourses and its analysis. Discourses are, however, not a simple concept to make explicable 
with a few pages restriction – its intricate nature requires more than a brief tête à tête. As 
Fairclough (1992) notes: “Discourses is a difficult concept, largely because there are so many 
conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary 
standpoints” (p.3). I will, nevertheless, make an effort to explain the concept abundantly. A 
brief assessment of theory and method are therefore first provided, before critical discourse 
analysis is linked more explicitly to my master project. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis as theory and method 
Socio-constructivism can be seen as one of the philosophical cornerstones in discourse 
analysis, as its epistemological notion of knowledge, truths and reality seeps through the very 
concept of a discourse. Socio-constructivism entails the idea that our concept of ‟reality‟ can 
be understood as subjective and changeable images of reality. Reality, truths, and knowledge 
are social constructed and will vary depending on contexts – time, place, and culture aid 
shaping our perceptions of the world. An objective account of „the real world‟ is consequently 
unattainable. What we can attain, however, is an identification of our different representations 
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of reality (Neumann, 2001). This brings us to the concept of discourses – a term which seeks 
to make the constantly changeable „reality‟ more comprehensible.  
 
A discourse can, generally speaking, be understood as “a specific way to talk about and 
perceive the world” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999 p.9), although, the simplicity of this account 
does not sufficiently manage to identify a discourse‟s scope. Toews (2004) elaborates and 
divide the term in two different approaches; discourse understood as text, and discourse 
understood as an overarching structural dimension. The former approach is concerned with 
systems of categorizations and codes in a communicative process. Text and language are 
relevant in the latter approach as well, albeit in the second understanding the focal aspiration 
is an analysis of the discourse‟s underlying dimensions. It is, as Toews (2004) notes, the 
“discourse as the historical a priori of thought, speech, and action” which is attempt analyzed 
(p.8917). This latter discoursive approach can further be linked to Michel Foucault (1970; 
1972) and his theories as regards representations, order of discourse, hegemonic dimensions, 
and discoursive power. One essential account in Foucauldian theories is that ”discourses exert 
power because they transport knowledge on which collective and individual consciousness 
feeds. This knowledge is the basis for individual and collective, discursive and non-discursive 
action, which in turn shapes reality” (Jäger & Maier, 2009 p.39). An identification of what is 
acknowledged as truths, in addition to discover who has the power to craft these truths, 
implies profound and critical insight into a discourse. The question is thus; how can one 
examine structural and abstract aspects which are imbedded in a discourse? Foucauldian 
theories answer this inquiry by presenting the critical discourse analysis (CDA).   
 
The analysis of thought is always allegorical in relation to the discourse that it employs. Its question is 
unfailingly: what was being said in what was said? The analysis of the discoursive field is orientated in a 
quite different way; we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its 
conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be 
connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes. We do not seek below what is 
manifest the half silent murmur of another discourse; we must show why it could not be other than it was, 
in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of others and in relation to them, a 
place that no other could occupy. The question proper to such an analysis might be formulated in this way: 
what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else? (Foucault, 1972 p.30f). 
 
In others, and maybe more comprehensible, words; “CDA reveal the contradictions within 
and between discourses, the limits of what can be said and done, and the means by which 
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discourse makes particular statements seem rational and beyond all doubt, even though  they 
are only valid at a certain time and place” (Jäger & Maier, 2009 p.36)7. 
 
Even if Foucault often is perceived as „the father‟ of critical discourse analysis, numerous 
theorists have postulated renowned analytical methods derived from it. Norman Fairclough 
(1992), for instance, altered and built upon Foucault‟s original theories so as to corporate 
aspects such as interdiscoursive relations and change. Interdiscourse is derived from the 
Foucauldian term „order of discourse‟; a concept which conveys the idea that “different 
discourses are intimately entangled with each other and together form the giant milling mass 
of overall societal discourse” (Jäger & Maier, 2009 p.35). These interdiscursive links are 
central in critical discourse analysis, as it aims to analyse and disentangle this discursive net 
(ibid.). Also Faircloughs concept of discoursive change is built upon Foucauldian discourse 
theories – especially upon aspect such as power and discoursive hegemony. As Fairclough 
(1992) notes; “Hegemonic struggle ... contributes in varying degrees to the reproduction or 
transformation not only of the existing order of discourse ... but also through that of existing 
social and power relations” (p.93). Hegemonic struggles in a discourse can therefore be seen 
to facilitate change.  
 
Discoursive change, hegemonic struggles, and effects of dominant representations are 
significant facets in critical discourse analysis, although, critical discourse analysis does not 
only encompass theories and methods postulated by Foucault and Fairclough. Numerous 
authors have contributed with major works in this field, such as Jørgensen and Phillips 
(1999), Neumann (2001), and Toews (2004). These theories cover a range of different 
discoursive aspects and can aid in an analysis of the discourse of educational neuroscience. 
 
An analysis of educational neuroscience as a discourse 
Critical discourse analysis elaborates on discoursive structures which contribute to shape how 
we think and speak, and as such, direct our knowledge, truths, and representations (Neumann, 
2001). Discourse theories can therefore be appropriate to analyze the discipline of educational 
neuroscience. Discourse analysis does, however, comprise numerous different theories and 
methods. Subsequently a selection has to be made as to manage analyzing elements of the 
educational neuroscience discourse in a practicable manner. The sections which follow will 
                                                          
7
 Foucault’s work is often alleged as quite intricate and difficult to grasp. In this thesis I have used Foucault’s 
original literature, but have nevertheless tried to corroborate my understandings with supplementary literature 
so as to prevent falling under inaccuracies and misinterpretations as regards Foucaults theories. 
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try to justify why certain discoursive aspects are applied in this thesis and how critical 
discourse analysis is attempted utilised in this master-project. 
 
Specific clarifications for this thesis  
There are some clarifications which ought to be made as to prevent misapprehensions. What 
first need to be noted is that critical discourse analysis encompasses both discourse theories 
and methods. Foucault (1979; 1972) has, for instance, chiefly postulated discoursive theories 
(e.g. on order of discourse, power relations, and language). Fairclough (1992) has also put 
forward theories (e.g. on interdiscourse and discoursive change), but has additionally 
postulated analytical methods on how to execute such analysis. Following this, and my second 
clarification, is that I will not draw on one single discourse theory or method. Instead I will be 
inspired by several – ranging from Foucault (1970; 1972) to Fairclough (1992); from 
Neumann (2001) to Jäger and Maier (2009). Seeing that all of these authors elaborate on 
different discoursive aspects and to different extent, the span of theories might be proven 
copious for an abundant analysis. What thirdly ought to be stressed is that even if critical 
discourse analysis offers specific analytical methods, this thesis will not follow any 
methodological step-by-step recipe. This is because “CDA is not a rigid formula that can be 
followed mechanically to produce result. Depending on the research question and the type of 
material used, different procedures are appropriate” (ibid. p.56). Fairclough (1992) states as 
much himself, claiming that “one cannot simply „apply‟ Foucault‟s work in discourse 
analysis; it is … a matter of „putting Foucault‟s perspective to work” (p.38). Critical discourse 
analysis – both its theories and methods – will therefore function more as frameworks and 
guide-lines in this master project, rather than applications of specific method-procedures. Due 
to what is mentioned above, it should also be noted that the theoretical framework in this 
project will comprise discoursive theories and not theories extracted from educational 
neuroscience itself. Again we are falling back at the focal point in Foucauldian premises – 
neutral and objective theories do not exist; what one can allocate, on the other hand, are 
different representations (Jäger & Maier, 2009). Theories concerning educational 
neuroscience must therefore be perceived as analytical entities in this discourse analysis.   
 
Clarifications must also be made as regards the notion of discourse, and why the discipline of 
educational neuroscience independently can be seen as a discourse. Fairclough (1992) note: 
 
„Discourse‟ is widely used in social theory and analysis, for example in the work of Michel Foucault, to 
refer to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice … Discourses do not just reflect 
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or represent social entities and relations, they construct or „constitute‟ them; different discourses constitute 
key entities (be they „mental illness‟, „citizenship‟ or „literacy‟) in different ways, and position people in 
different ways as social subjects (e.g. as doctors or patients) (p.3f).  
 
Drawing on this account, the discipline of educational neuroscience can thus be defined as „a 
discourse‟. Not only can it be seen as an entity evolving around specific areas of knowledge 
and social practice; educational neuroscience also structure knowledge and social practice as 
to shape relations, hierarchies and discoursive positions. This new discipline does, 
furthermore, position people in accordance to this (e.g. scientist, academics, teachers, and 
pupils). Educational neuroscience can, as such, be understood as a discourse in itself and a 
discoursive analysis can subsequently be utilized at this topic.  
 
Clarification of educational neuroscience as a „discourse‟ generates another issue; where does 
the discourse of educational neuroscience begin and where does it end? Neumann (2001) 
states that discoursive boundaries are neither prearranged nor constant. The analyst must 
therefore take stance with regard to this.   
 
A discourse cannot be entirely separated from other discourses. How discourses are delimited in accordance 
to others, and how social sequences are assigned different discourses, depends upon its advocates and the 
shared meaning they allocate the discourse at hand. Discoursive delimitation is therefore in itself a research 
question for the discourse analyst (p.56 [my translation]).  
 
Given that this thesis is anchored in educational neuroscience, it is reasonable to focus on the 
focal aspiration and the shared meaning allocated „educational neuroscience‟. Considering 
that numerous authors concur that the aim of the discipline is to craft reciprocal collaborations 
between education and neuroscience (Patten & Campbell, 2011), this shared meaning will be 
the discourse‟s focal core. In this thesis an international debate on educational neuroscience 
is additionally attempted covered. It will therefore be profitable to draw the discoursive 
boundaries so that they encompass different standpoints in the debate as well. This imply that 
the discourse of educational neuroscience, as it will be used in this thesis, encompass more 
than the academic discipline of educational neuroscience. Consequently it will not be the 
enterprise of educational neuroscience which will be analysed – i.e. specific examples on how 
cognitive neuroscience is applied in educational theories and practice – but rather different 
opinions as regards this enterprise
8
.  
                                                          
8
 My attention on the debate regarding educational neuroscience does not imply that I do not see necessity of 
analytical research on the enterprise of educational neuroscience. On the contrary; I will deem that scientific 
elaboration and analysis of explicit connections between cognitive neuroscience and educational are of highly 
importance. The scope of this thesis does, however, not grant me the opportunity for the profound elaboration 
such an undertaking requisite. 
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Critical discourse analysis and educational neuroscience 
A critical discourse inspired analysis of educational neuroscience implies an analysis of 
aspects such as different discoursive positions, ideological struggles, and interdiscoursive 
connections. All these facets make interesting aspects of study since they affect how one 
thinks and what is perceived as „truths‟ in the discourse of educational neuroscience. 
Revealing these structures, on the other hand, is easier said than done. Neumann (2001) has 
postulated three general steps towards a sufficient discourse analysis which can aid as 
profitable guidelines: “delimitation of the discourse, identification of the discourse‟s 
representations, and identification of its stratifications” (p.50). When it comes to the first 
aspect, this has already been done earlier in this chapter where educational neuroscience were 
defined as a discourse and its boundaries were drawn as to encompass aspects profitable for 
the research question at hand. Neumann‟s second step includes an identification of 
representations allocated in the educational neuroscience discourse. Considering that 
educational neuroscience already has become a prominent international debate, the different 
representations allocated can be many. Had there not been numerous representations 
conflicting with one another, there would not have been a debate to analyze in the first place. 
The task is therefore to group different arguments, pin-point representations, identify 
ideologies, and draw relations between them. It is, in other words, an attempt to map the 
discourse; to sort out the chaotic murmur of different voices so as to distinguish who is saying 
what, with what authority, and with what effect? This endeavor will aid to discern different 
discoursive positions. Identification of discoursive positions and different representations will 
furthermore lead to Neumann‟s (2001) third analytical aspect – that of discoursive 
stratification. This term do, to some extent, entail relations one can find between different 
discoursive positions; relations which both Foucault‟s (1970; 1972) theories on power, order 
of discourse and dominant hierarchies, and Fairclough‟s (1992) theory on interdiscoursivity, 
can aid elaborating. Discoursive stratification additionally encompasses relations between a 
discourse‟s representations. Neumann (2001) elaborates, stating that “some discoursive 
representations are more difficult to change than others; sign which are “easy to think with” 
and representations of material objects are among these” (p.66). Discoursive stratification can 
thus be linked to Faircloughs (1992) theories on discoursive change – a term which moreover 
is linked to interdiscourses. 
 
The boundaries between elements may be lines of tension … [C]ontradictions between such domains may 
become the basis for struggles to redefine their boundaries and relationship, struggles to extend the 
properties ... Social and discoursive tendencies are established through struggle, and they are furthermore 
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established with only a limited stability, with the prospect that their own heterogeneous elements will be 
experienced as contradictory and lead to further struggle and change (p.68ff). 
 
Even if Fairclough elaborates on discoursive change, he does not give considerably notion to 
factors which usually generate predicaments in the first place. Thomas Kuhn (1962), on the 
other hand, expands on this with his theories on „scientific revolutions‟. Kuhn is not an author 
usually characterized as a discourse analyst. His theories on scientific revolutions can 
nevertheless be apposite illuminating upheavals in education neuroscience, and will therefore 
briefly been referred to in this thesis.  
 
An analysis of the educational neuroscience discourse can, as previously mentioned, be 
achieved at two different levels. One approach reflects on linguistic analysis, whilst the other 
considers aspects regarding more overarching discoursive structures (Toews, 2004). In this 
thesis I have chosen the latter approach, making discoursive facets such as discoursive 
positions, ideologies, dominant representations, power relations, and interdiscursive 
entanglement the focus of study. Texts, in the form of academic articles, will still be the 
general data material, but no linguistic analysis will be provided. Instead different discoursive 
and structural aspects are attempted reveled by critically analyzing literature on educational 
neuroscience. Literature used as analytical material in this project will therefore chiefly 
consists of international articles published in prominent scientific journals
9
 and educational 
neuroscience reports such as the ones published by OECD/CERI (2007b) and TLRP/EDRC 
(Howard-Jones, 2007). Articles on educational neuroscience are not the only literature which 
has been reviewed. Since a prominent aim in this thesis is to analyze interdiscoursive 
connections, also articles exterior to the discipline itself have been included. This literature do 
mainly consist of the works by Carl N. Degler (1991) and C.P Snow (1959; 1962), in addition 
to later articles elaborating on divisions between natural and social sciences
10
. The literature 
being used in this thesis is thus ranging from different academic fields – from education to 
psychology, and from articles on cognitive neuroscience to articles in general social science. 
A broad range of text-material has been chosen in order to include as many, and as different, 
voices as possible so as to strengthen the analysis representativeness
 11
. Foucauldian theories 
on discoursive power stress this point, in view of the idea that “certain groups and individuals 
                                                          
9
 Journals such as ’Educational Philosophy and Theory’, ‘Educational Researcher’, ‘Life, Sciences, Education’, 
‘Nature Reviews Neuroscience’, ‘Mind, Brain, and Education’, and ‘Research Intelligence’.  
10
 DiMaggio (1997), Bergesen (2004), and Johnston (2007), just to mention a few. 
11
 It should also be noted that I in search for relevant literature have received supportive recommendations 
from contacts at ’Center for Educational Neuroscience’ (i.e. Prof. A. Tolmie), and at ’Neurosociety’ (i.e. Dr. T. 
Schneider at ’University of Oxford’). 
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have more power over discourse than others, for example because they have privileged access 
to the media or greater financial recourses. Exclusions inherent to the structure of discourse 
can thus be amplified by institutional conditions” (Jäger & Maier, 2009 p.39). A discourse 
analysis thus requests a literature scope which is representative for the discourse at question, 
in addition to attentive and critical readings of the literature at hand.  
 
One last note must be made before moving onwards with this thesis: Educational 
neuroscience is a broad topic and the international debate encompasses numerous different 
voices. I have therefore found it practical to make some categorizations and labels as to make 
the entanglement more comprehensible
12
. Categorization of arguments and viewpoints into 
restricted discoursive positions is, however, a simplification. Advocates sited in one position 
can, for instance, agree upon some aspects whilst bickering on others. Moreover, different 
discoursive position can fuse into each other or even overlap with other discourses. What is 
more, and what is important to stress; the different discoursive positions in the debate are 
abstract positions. Not only will such categorizations be simplistic generalization; names 
given in this thesis are also labels made as to distinguish one group from the other. Peep in at 
a discussion-panel on educational neuroscience, and I can assure you will not see any people 
walking around with discoursive nametags around their necks. Names and illustrations 
provided in this thesis, both as regards discoursive positions and of different „gaps‟ between 
these positions, are therefore merely designed as to aid elucidating the entanglement of 
discoursive structures in educational neuroscience. Labels have been given and 
simplifications have indeed been made; albeit these generalizations are difficult to elude. 
Hovering above the discourse from an observer‟s point of view, I have thus seized the 
delightful opportunity to group, label, and simplify the discourse‟s buzzing life. To ease my 
conscience for putting pieces of reality into labeled boxes, I will end by stressing that this 
truly has been attempted done in a most objective
13
 and legitimate way as possible.  
 
                                                          
12
 Such as labels for the different discoursive positions (i.e. ‘misguided enthusiasm’, ‘pessimistic skepticism’, 
‘hesitant optimism’ and ‘cautious optimism’), and the ‘gap’ found between them (i.e. ‘the peripheral gap’ and 
‘the underlying gap’). Names given to different discoursive positions are, however, inspired by names 
frequently used by authors in the discourse themselves. The name ‘cautious optimism’ is, for instance, derived 
from numerous advocates who stress the fact that one ought to be cautious in the linking of education and 
neuroscience (Varma et al., 2008). 
13
 One cannot look away from the claim that unadulterated objectiveness is a concept of impossibility. Besides, 
and as Jørgensen and Phillip (1999) note; ”critical discourse analysis does not perceive itself as political neutral 
(as objectivistic social science often do); but as a critical approach politically engaged in social change … 
Besides, one often has the intent that results derived from critical discourse analysis, can be used in the strive 
for radical social change”(p.76). The reader ought to bear this in mind. 
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3. Educational neuroscience as an academic discipline 
This master thesis does not only aim to critically analyse the discourse of educational 
neuroscience; the thesis also seeks to offer an “introduction” of sort, to this novel academic 
discipline. Both endeavours do, nevertheless, require an account of educational neuroscience 
– its historical frame, international and national expansion, and the discipline‟s core and aim.  
 
The historical framework of educational neuroscience 
Foucault (1972) states that a discourse cannot fully be comprehended without linking the 
discourse to a historical frame. Anchoring educational neuroscience to the past can be 
conducted in numerous ways, and with different profundity of analysis, depending on one‟s 
focus of attention. Due to relevance, only previously traces concerning the relation brain-
mind-behaviour will be taken into account. This section will therefore start by briefly reassess 
the behaviouristic approach to learning, before drawing attention to individual cognitive 
theories, socio-constructivism, and subsequently educational neuroscience.  
 
The linking of cognitive neuroscience and education is unquestionable innovative, but the 
connection brain-mind-behaviour is however not an original thought. The history of education 
reveals an inclination to understand why children act as they do – how children come to learn 
and incorporate new knowledge. At the turn from the 19
th
 to the 20
th
 century, a behaviouristic 
approach to learning held a central position in the educational discourse. At this time, learning 
was understood as a direct cause from outer stimuli (cf. Skinner), and learning methods such 
as Thornidikes „drill and skill‟ approach were common (Ferrari, 2011). Behaviouristic 
approaches met, however, critique during the early 1900 from more pragmatic approaches, 
such as learning theories postulated by Dewey. Parallel with this tension between 
behaviourism and pragmatism, the discipline of educational psychology emerged – a 
discipline which interrelated psychological findings with educational practice. At first this 
new academic field did not get any strong roothold in education, but by the 1960s educational 
psychology increased its influence. Accordingly models from cognitive information-
processing approaches and constructivist learning theories from Piaget captured the interest of 
educational academics (ibid.). These approaches focused on the individual child, as they tried 
to explain how individual cognitive processes generate learning (Woolfolk, 2006). At the 
same time one can also find commencement of positivism in the educational sector (Telhaug 
& Mediås, 2003). Positivistic approaches did, however, meet profound critique from 
numerous authors in social science. Not only did the positivist approach interfere with well 
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established boundaries between social and natural science (cf. the nature-nurture dispute), it 
also gave theory precedence over practice (ibid.). A positivistic perspective also committed 
the crime of reductionism, as it tried to reduce social studies by forcing them to subject to 
nature scientific methods and philosophies (Choudhury, Nagel & Slaby, 2009). Aversion to 
positivism amongst social scientist was clear, and resulted in a disclamation of the positivistic 
approach in the 80‟s (Telhaug & Mediås, 2003). Following this, socio-constructivist theories 
derived from Vygotsky won ground in education around the 1990‟s. Compared to for instance 
Piagetian individualistic approaches to learning, Vygotsky took more consideration to 
contextual factors such as environment and culture in the process of cognitive development 
and learning. As the years have elapsed, the strong significance assign societal factors have 
maintained in the educational discourse, and socio-constructivism has subsequently become a 
well proverbial account in educational learning theories (ibid.; Bergesen, 2004).  
 
 
 
This model is built upon the brain-mind-behaviour model presented in TLPR (Howard-Jones, 2007) and 
Howard-Jones (2011) ‘level of actions’ model. I chose to fuse these two models as to better illustrate how 
behaviouristic approaches to learning tend to consider individual behavior, how individual constructivism 
often focus on individual mind and behaviour, whilst socio-constructivism consider societal variables in 
addition to individual mind and behaviour in learning.  
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At the turn of the 21
st
 century we seem to have reached a new era in the history of cognitive 
science. Numerous authors have entitled this new era a „scientific revolution‟ (Ferrari, 2011; 
Ansari et al., 2011), referring to the advance of new technologies and the possibilities these 
technologies bring forth
14
. Tools such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have not 
only assisted in the corroboration of disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience; these tools 
also offer new insight into the secrets of the brain. Subsequently, what previously were 
merely hypothesis of the mysterious brain have now become observable (Howard-Jones, 
2007). New technologies present the human brain in a new light, revealing some of its 
structures and functions. The vague dotted-lined box marked „brain‟ is no longer a locked box 
of mystery.  
 
Even though some mysteries of the brain have become scientifically observable, the „answer‟ 
to the conundrum of the brain-mind-behaviour relation is not necessarily endowed.   
 
High resolution imaging such as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have probably 
attracted the greatest popular interest. However, such techniques only provide us with an image of the 
biological changes occurring in the brain, such as blood flow. They do not allow us to „see‟ thinking or 
learning directly. To understand what such an image has to do with learning, we need a psychological 
model to help us relate it to our mental processes – i.e. a cognitive model. When cognitive models and 
our knowledge of biological processes inform each other, we can feel more confident about both 
(Howard-Jones, 2007 p.17).  
 
In other words and for the sake of simplicity; „the mind‟ lies between scientifically observable 
facts of the brain and observable facts of behavior (see model). Our technologies do not allow 
us to observe processes of this middle step; e.g. thinking and learning. What new technologies 
do provide us with, is innovative knowledge of the brain – knowledge which further can 
anchor models of the mind in more profound ways. Cognitive neuroscience is one of the 
disciplines which have undertaken this quest, as it links brain biology with cognition of mind 
(Howard-Jones, 2007). So far this discipline‟s endeavour has succeeded fair enough, as it has 
engendered numerous scientific cognitive models and theories
15
. Furthermore, new 
knowledge of the brain and mind do not merely provide supplementary theories; they also call 
forth adjustment of old cognitive theories. Subsequently, and inevitably, these new theories 
shake the foundation to concepts related to the cognition of mind (ibid.).  
                                                          
14
 Drawing on Thomas S. Kuhn’s theories on scientific revolution, this clam of a ‘scientific revolution’ might be 
well grounded. Limited space restrains me to elaborate further, albeit one can read more in Kuhn (1962) The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
15
 For brief examples of some of these theories see page 20-22. 
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The rapid development of functional neuroimaging techniques has give researchers unprecedented access to 
the behaving brains of healthy children and adults. The result has been a wave of new insights into 
thinking, emotion, motivation, learning, and development. As these insights suffuse the social sciences, 
they sometimes inspire reconsideration of existing explanations (Varma et al.  2008 p.140).  
 
Unlocking the box of the brain has thus crafted a domino reaction in science; As the veil of 
mystery fell and secrets of the brain were reviled, cognitive models of the mind became 
altered, causing nearby and following pieces to waver. Educational theories built upon aged 
cognitive models of the mind hold no immunity to this domino effect – the ground of the 
educational field has thus started to shudder.  
 
What then, has this shift in the scientific field resulted in? What consequences have these new 
theories of the brain and mind crafted in education? First of all it can be noted that innovative 
knowledge of the cognition of mind has shaken profound educational believes as regards 
learning and cognitive development. This alteration is due the notion that numerous 
educational theories build upon elderly cognitive model which now are questioned (Varma et 
al, 2008). Secondly, scientific findings of the brain have captured the interest of the society at 
large, causing politicians to call for scientifically grounded practices in institutions such as 
education (OECD, 2007a)
16
.  
 
Educational neuroscience is generating valuable new knowledge to inform policy and practice: On many 
questions, neuroscience builds on the conclusions of existing knowledge and everyday observation but its 
important contribution is in enabling the move from correlation to causation – understanding the 
mechanisms behind familiar patterns – to help identify effective solutions. On other questions, 
neuroscience is generating new knowledge, thereby opening up new avenues (OECD, 2007b p.17). 
 
For these reasons, numerous academics began advocating for the importance of taking 
neuroscientific findings into consideration in education. By the early 90‟s, the first stones in 
the foundation of what soon would become educational neuroscience were thus laid.   
  
Educational neuroscience as a growing international discipline 
Educational neuroscience commenced in the 90‟s in the same way as almost every other novel 
field of study; old believes were questioned, arguments for a „new way‟ were postulated, 
which again lead to profound debate in academia as regards this recent subject of matter – the 
possible link between education and cognitive neuroscience (Kuhn, 1962; Schwartz & 
                                                          
16
 OECDs call for scientifically grounded education and evidence-based practice must not be misunderstood as 
a demand for a universal classroom formula, but rather a request for more scientifically grounded approaches 
to learning (read more Ogden, 2008).  
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Gerlach, 2011). In the early 90‟s these voices of change were mainly manifested in the form 
of international academic articles. As the decennium elapsed, educational neuroscience grew 
from being a topic of interest to becoming defined as an academic field of study. Recently, 
numerous authors have even claimed it a new discipline (Petitto & Dunbar, 2004; Patten & 
Campbell, 2011). Labels of scholastic ranking notwithstanding; the increased consideration 
paid to educational neuroscience is notable. Not only does the significant amount of scientific 
articles on the subject demonstrate as much; also foundations of numerous transdisciplinary 
collaborations
17
, launching of the scientific journal Mind, Brain, and Education in 2007, 
TLRP/EDRC‟s report on ‘Neuroscience and Education’ (Howard-Jones, 2007), and OECD‟s 
seven years protracted project ”Learning Science and Brain Research” (2007b) contribute 
underlining the notion of educational neuroscience. Additionally one should note that a 
masters and a doctoral program in „Mind, Brain, and Education‟ were established at Harvard 
University Graduate School of Education in 1999, whilst at present numerous similar 
graduate-level programs in educational neuroscience are commenced – e.g. in Cambridge 
(England), China, and Texas (at Arlington/Dallas) (Stein & Fischer, 2011).  
 
Educational neuroscience has not only advanced within educational academic spheres; this 
novel discipline is also highly relevant as to current political and societal concerns (Geake, 
2005). In the society at large one can find increased curiosity as regards our brain and how it 
works (Ansari et al, 2011). Popular-science books ornament windows of bookstores and not 
one day goes past without a neuroscientific article is recited in media. This interest has further 
led to increased attention as regards the connection between education and the brain – both 
politically and in the media (ibid.). Inclinations towards the topic are for instant evident in the 
significant amount of attention OECD has paid to educational neuroscience. OECD/CERI‟s 
seven years protracted project ‘Learning Science and Brain Research’ (2007b) evinces as 
much. Not only does this report scrutinise the discipline of educational neuroscience, it also 
concludes that “Educational neuroscience is generating valuable new knowledge to inform 
educational policy and practice” (OECD, 2007b p.17). This opinion is of essential note 
considering that OECD holds an international position of prominence. As Karlsen (2006) 
states; “OECD has a significant and unique position as premises contractor … OECD appears 
as independent and generally apolitical; facets which gives its reports, declarations, and 
                                                          
17
 International Mind, Brain, and Education Society (IMBES); Centre for Educational Neuroscience (CEN) in 
London; Centre for Neuroscience in Education (CNE) in University of Cambridge; Brain, Neuroscience and 
Education (BNE, SIG); Research Schools Network (RSN) in Texas – just to mention a few. 
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recommendations more strength” (p.202f  [my translation]). Altogether this contributes to 
underline the concept of educational neuroscience.  
 
There is little doubt that educational neuroscience has grown internationally both in extent 
and in strength over the last two decades. On this note, I will also convey the impression that 
the debate on educational neuroscience also can be expected to reach Norwegian educational 
spheres. In fact, traces can already be found in academia, in the society at large, and in 
educational policy. Even if the term „educational neuroscience‟ not yet has been established 
as a familiar idiom amongst Norwegian academics and politicians, aspects of the international 
debate are evident. Not only has a national debate on the division between natural and social 
science once again caught numerous academics attention
18
. These outlines have also been 
manifested in educational policy documents, as numerous Norwegian politicians repeatedly 
necessitate science based research in educational tuition and practice
19.  “New knowledge as 
regards learning and school-development is not systematically taken into consideration in 
schools” it is stated in St.meld nr.11. (2008-2009 p.10). Subsequently it is required  
“increased requisites as regards academic quality, better practice, increased focus on 
professionalization, and more scientifically grounded education” (Meld. St. 19, 2009-2010, 
p.28 [my translation]). Assertions on the importance of more scientifically grounded 
education and teaching have furthermore led to establishment of NAFOL
20
 and Programme 
for Educational Research („Utdanning 2020‟). These trends in national educational policy can 
further be seen interlinked with the ongoing debate on evidence-based education 
(Utdanningsforbundet, 2008). Both the debate concerning evidence-based education, and 
scientific based requisites in political documents, can therefore be suggestive of discoursive 
strains en route a debate on educational neuroscience. This assumption is strengthened by the 
notable significance OECD as a premises contractor allocates educational neuroscience (cf. 
Karlsen, 2006). Subsequently this conveys the impression that OECD‟s accentuation of the 
importance linking education and cognitive neuroscience most likely will, or will continue to, 
inflict Norwegian education.  
 
                                                          
18
 This recent academic debate were amplified by NRK’s popular-scientific program ‘Brainwash’; a program 
which further crafted considerable attention in media due to its nature-nurture problematization. 
19
 Requests for science based education must not be misinterpreted as demands for universal classroom 
formulas and teaching recipes, but rather requests for more scientifically grounded approaches to learning. (Cf. 
the national debate as regards evidence based education. For further reading see Ogden, 2008). 
20
 The Norwegian National Post Graduate School in Teacher Education (NAFOL) were established in 2010 to 
strengthen a research based perspective in education.  
 19 
 
The core and aim of educational neuroscience 
So far the historical foundation of educational neuroscience has been clarified and the 
discipline‟s international expansion has been elucidated, but what defines the discipline of 
educational neuroscience? What core does it evolve around, which aims does this new 
discipline seek to venture, and how is the connection education-neuroscience attempted 
achieved?  
 
Numerous advocators coincide as regards the discipline‟s focal aspiration; educational 
neuroscience venture to bring together educational theories and practice with neuroscientific 
research, theoretical knowledge, methods, and techniques, with the intention to generate better 
teaching and learning (Patten & Campbell, 2011; OECD, 2007b). Even if this new 
transdisciplinary field has been labelled educational neuroscience, the collaboration expands 
over a variety of different disciplines – ranging from cognitive neuroscience, neurobiology, 
social cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and educational theory, practice and 
policy (Howard-Jones, 2007). What this collaboration implies, in short, is a common 
inclination to connect biology of the brain, cognitive science of the mind, and educational 
theories and practice. The venture of educational neuroscience is thus a „bridging-project‟, as 
it commonly is referred to, as it aims to link brain-mind-behaviour in favour for improved 
educational theories and practices. Social aspects are accordingly accentuated in this 
enterprise, so that the centre of attention does not exclusively rest on cognitive neuroscience 
but also consider social aspect relevant for education (ibid.). If one conveys this to the model 
previously postulated, the discipline of educational neuroscience can thus be seen to draw a 
circle encompassing the mind-brain-behaviour relation in addition to social aspects.   
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When it comes to the fulfilment of these goals, numerous contributions have been postulated 
linking neuroscience and education. Some of these contributions elaborate on a theoretical 
level as regards educational neuroscience; others draw theories down to more accessible 
approaches to classroom practice. What appear to be in common for all these studies is that 
they anchor cognitive models of mind relevant to education, with new scientific results on 
how the brain works. As Petitto and Dunbar (2004) notes; “Because cognitive neuroscience 
have identified the major brain sites involved in memory, learning, attention, and reasoning, it 
is now possible to understand the types of cognitive and neural changes that occur in 
educationally relevant learning” (p.11). Furthermore, and what is a crucial point for 
educational studies, is that numerous of these neuroscientific studies accentuate the function 
of environmental factors when it comes to alterations in the brain.  
 
Neuroscientists have well established that the brain has a highly robust and well-developed capacity to 
change in response to environmental demands, a process called plasticity. This involves creating and 
strengthening some neuronal connections and weakening or eliminating others. The degree of 
modification depends on the type of learning that takes place, with long-term learning leading to more 
profound modification. It also depends on the period of learning, with infants experiencing 
extraordinary growth of new synapses. But a profound message is that plasticity is a core feature of the 
brain throughout life (OECD, 2007b p.13).  
 
Social and environmental factors, such as teachers, different learning methods, and other 
societal aspects, can contribute to enhanced learning and cognitive development (OECD, 
2007b; Howard-Jones, 2007). Blakemore and Firth (2005) concur, and additionally stress the 
notion that plasticity in the brain happens throughout life. This little word „throughout’ is easy 
to overlook, but it has profound consequences for education. A common assumption amongst 
numerous academics, both in neuroscience and in education, has been that the adult brain is 
incapable of change. This claim is due to the belief that adult brains neither do produce new 
cells, nor make new neural connections; a hypothesis which again were seen to explain 
deterioration in learning, performance, and memory in elders. “But research is beginning to 
show that this view of the brain is too pessimistic: the adult brain is flexible, it can grow new 
cells and make new connections ... The brain‟s plasticity depends critically on how much it is 
used” (ibid. p.460;). These new insights on the brain‟s adaptive plasticity and its possibility to 
change due to environmental factors throughout life, have further crafted numerous studies 
relevant for education: Studies on sensitive periods
21
 have resulted in significant knowledge 
                                                          
21
 Sensitive periods must not be mistaken for critical periods; the latter an old term for fixed and rigid ‘windows 
for learning’, whilst the former and newer term comprises “subtle changes in the brain’s ability to be shaped 
and changed by experiences that occur over a lifetime” (Blakemore & Firth, 2005 p: 460).  
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on cognitive development and how different types of learning are beneficial at different 
periods (Blakemore & Firth, 2005). Geake (2011) carried out a fMRI study on neural 
correlates of creative reasoning, concluding that fluid analogical thinking
22
 aids and enhances 
creative intelligence. Other researches explore related aspect relevant to education, such as 
dyslexia, dyscalculia, and ADHD (Howard-Jones, 2007), genetic links between brain, mind, 
and education (Plomin, Kovas & Haworth, 2007; Koizumi; 2011), emotional influence on 
cognition (Patten, 2011), and the importance of mirror-neurons in our ability to learn from 
observing others (Jong, Gog, Jenks et al., 2009). OECD‟s (2007b) report on educational 
neuroscience, in addition to the report postulated by TLRP/EDRC (Howard-Jones, 2007), 
designate similar conclusions.  
 
This and dozens of other studies indicate that delineating how the mind/brain represent knowledge and how 
learning changes this underlying knowledge is central to designing and implementing educational practice 
(Petitto & Dunbar, 2004 p.10).  
 
Together this underscore that recent knowledge of the brain can craft new cognitive models of 
mind, which in turn can engender new or strengthen old educational theories (OECD, 2007b). 
Understanding of mirror-neurons role in social processes for learning has, for instance, 
emphasized socio-constructivist theories such as those to Vygotsky and Bandura
23
 (Jong et 
al., 2009).  
 
New knowledge of the brain and mind have also challenged old and well established 
educational ideas. In their recent fMRI-study, Petitto and Dunbar (2004) investigated 
conceptual change and anomalies
24
 in learning. “The main untested assumption in much of 
contemporary science education is that students‟ naïve theories can be eliminated through 
presenting students with anomalies. Researchers argue that by presenting students with 
anomalies, students will realize that their naïve theory is incorrect and will reorganize 
(restructure) their knowledge, eventually arriving at the “correct” theory.” Petitto and Dunbar 
continue by noting that “Through intensive teaching using anomalies it is thought that naïve 
theories are eliminated. The use of anomalies has therefore been a cornerstone of 
                                                          
22
 Fluid analogizing is, in short, the ability to make analogies without limited ‘answers’; hence a term which 
incorporate a creative aspect in analogy-making. For further reading see Geake’s (2011) article Positron 
Statement on Motivations, Methodologies, and Practical Implications of Educational Neuroscience Research: 
fMRI studies of the neural correlates of creative intelligence. 
23
 Vygotsky stressed the importance of social interaction in cognitive development and learning, whilst 
Bandura’s learning theories focused on the importance of observing and modelling others behavior. 
24
 Anomalies are concepts which conflicts with ones prior believes and theories. 
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constructivist education” (ibid. p.11). In their study, however, they came to a conclusion 
which, to some extent, differs from this well-acknowledged constructivist assumption.  
 
[P]resenting students with information inconsistent with their theory (i.e. anomalies) results in inhibition 
rather than a restructuring of knowledge. Thus presenting students with anomalies may not be as effective a 
teaching strategy in science education as is currently thought (ibid. p.12).  
 
These results are noteworthy. Not only do they provide significant new knowledge on how 
people learn; these results also question well-held believes in education. This crafts notable 
outcomes in the educational field. First of all; when novel insights of the brain and mind 
challenge old cognitive theories, this emphasize the fact that „truths‟ are not written in stone – 
previously held believes can falter and new ideas will take their place (Foucault, 1972 ; Kuhn, 
1962). Secondly; when old and well-profound educational theories quaver, it subsequently 
affects views on how educational classroom practice ought to be conducted. A third 
consequence crafted by new understandings of the mind and brain, is a profound upheaval 
amongst educational academics. This upheaval has gradually accumulated over the last two 
decades, leading to the advance of an international debate on educational neuroscience in 
academia. This debate does not only question if educational neuroscience is beneficial or not; 
the discussion also evolve around the query if the linking of education and neuroscience even 
is possible. Different standpoints towards this new discipline are many; different arguments 
being voiced even more. The debate on educational neuroscience thus makes an intriguing 
discipline for further examination and analysis.  
 
4. The debate – discursive positions in educational neuroscience  
The idea of representations is a focal point in critical discourse analysis, as it underlies the 
concept of a changing world where no truths can be perceived as neither objective, static, or 
universal (Neumann, 2001). In some discourses one can find a state of hegemony, where one 
representation of the world is perceived as „undisputable‟ and is thus unchallenged. Other 
discourses, however, hold different representations which constantly strive to be 
acknowledged as „the true‟ account of the world (ibid.). Educational neuroscience with its 
recent entry in academia is, as would be expected, a discourse of the latter. Conflicting 
discursive positions are thus inevitable. Which different positions can be located, and what 
representation these positions hold, are tasks for a discourse analysis to explicate. On this note 
it must be stressed that discourse analysis do not endeavour to provide detailed content 
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reviews as such, but instead attempt to go behind the discursive standpoints. Only a brief 
overview of the different educational neuroscience positions will thus be provided. 
 
I am, after examining academic articles related to the ongoing debate on educational 
neuroscience, alleged to deem that one can identify four main discursive positions in the 
debate. Diametrically opposed each other one can find what I have chosen to label pessimistic 
scepticism and misguided enthusiasm. The other two positions are allocated somewhere in-
between these two camps, and could be labelled hesitant optimism and cautious optimism
25
. 
Geake (2005) illustrate a similar categorisation by claiming that:  
 
On the one hand, there are those aging education academics who, after a lifetime of not understanding and 
disparaging all science, see no need to change their ways now. On the other hand, there are the „brain-
based‟ enthusiasts who hope that the current fads of left-right thinking, brain gym, etc., will address the 
complexities and daily challenges of the mixed-ability classroom. A middle-way would seem to involve 
neuroscientific education for both groups so that the education profession can shape a professionally 
informative educational neuroscience research agenda for the future (p.10). 
 
As to illustrate the different discoursive positions which can be allocated in the debate on 
educational neuroscience, I have made a basic illustration. The simplicity of the model must 
be noted. The figure does, nonetheless, comply with the following sections where the four 
discoursive positions are reviewed.  
 
                                                          
25
 Even if I have chosen to simplify, generalise, and label the debate into these categories, this is done by 
drawing on similar accounts from other authors – e.g. Geake (2005) Varma et al. (2008). 
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Misguided enthusiasm  
At the end of the 20
th
 century cognitive neuroscience started to gain attention in the 
educational field. This increased interest correlates with both amplified public concerns in 
school affairs and with politicians call for “evidence” in education. A request for “proof”, 
“what works”, and “the best educational practice” soon became catchphrases in the society at 
large (Utdanningsforbundet, 2008). Consequently, some people attempt to answer these 
requests by creating teaching programs claimed to be based on neuroscience. With eager 
enthusiasm these advocators postulate theories on how left-and-right brained children ought to 
be taught, how children should be labelled either as „visual‟, „auditory‟ or „kinaesthetic‟ 
learners, and how „Brain Gym‟ and pressing certain „Brain Buttons‟ can improve children‟s‟ 
learning (Goswami, 2006). These theories are not submissively put forward, but rather eagerly 
offered to teacher as answers to the pursuit of „what works‟ in classroom practice. As such, 
„brain based‟ teaching formulas and educational programs have become profitable facets in a 
„brain based learning industry‟ (ibid.). 
 
The problem, however, is that numerous of these educational programs are based upon 
inadequately links between neuroscience and educational practice. Instead of answering the 
society‟s plea for „what works‟, these misguided enthusiasts craft „neuromyths’ (ibid.). 
 
Although there is a growing body of peer-reviewed literature and websites that provides clear and accurate 
summaries of progress in the cognitive neuroscience of learning, there are at the same time questionable 
media reports and numerous other claims about „brain-based learning‟ that, in our opinion, often 
oversimplify, misrepresent, and allow for „neuromyths‟ to flourish (Ansari & Coch, 2006 p.147). 
 
What appears to be the fatal inaccuracy committed by the misguided enthusiasts is the lack of 
reciprocal collaboration between education and neuroscience. Instead of a two-way 
association, a direct and downward route from the brain-mind-behaviour relationship is 
drawn. This direct route from cognitive neuroscience to educational practice can be a fallacy. 
By constructing a linear course of action from the individual brain, to the mind, and down to 
behaviour, one reduces individual behavior by forcing it to fit cognitive neuroscientific 
explanations of biological changes in the brain (Howard-Jones, 2007). Not only does this 
imply an educational reductionism under neuroscientific findings; it also implies that 
neuroscientific findings uncritically are transformed to educational practices (ibid.). Such 
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reductionism and inaccuracies can further be at risk replicating the same „errors of the 
instrumentalism‟26 as Skjervheim warned about in the 1960. 
 
Misguided enthusiasts, with their misguided teaching remedies, can therefore give the 
impression to leap „the gap‟ between education and neuroscience to swiftly. This over-
enthusiastic venture has consequently gained much critic, both from the neuroscientific field, 
from other educational academics, and from international organisations such as OECD.  
 
Over the past few years, there has been a growing number of misconceptions circulating about the brain – 
“neuromyths”. They are relevant to education as many have been developed as ideas about, or approaches 
to, how we learn. These misconceptions often have their origins in some element of sound science, which 
makes identifying and refuting them the more difficult. As they are incomplete, extrapolated beyond 
evidence, or plain false, they need to be dispelled in order to prevent education running into a series of 
dead-ends (OECD, 2007b p.4). 
 
Pessimistic scepticism 
Whilst misguided enthusiasts leap „the gap‟ in a too swift jump, the camp of pessimistic 
sceptics refuses to even cross it. It is therefore no surprise that the most profound criticism 
towards educational neuroscience comes from this discoursive position. By reviewing their 
arguments, the sceptics‟ criticism can be seen as to evolve around at least two aspects. 
Pessimistic sceptics do, first of all, condemn the misguided learning industry and their 
neuromyths. This censure is not only underscored by educational reductionism, it is also 
stressed by referring to studies where “brain-based learning” has failed in its attempt to 
improve children‟s learning (Varma et al. 2008). The whole discipline of educational 
neuroscience is, by the same token, condemned. The second critique voiced, are judgments 
concerning „the gap‟ between education and cognitive neuroscience. This „gap‟ is, in 
accordance to the sceptics, so profound and so unpleasantly vast that a bridging-project 
should not even be initiated. The camp of pessimistic sceptics does, for these reasons, dismiss 
the link between the two fields and the concept of educational neuroscience is exclusively 
declined (Howard-Jones, 2007). 
 
Varma, McCandliss and Schwartz (2008) have consolidated this disinclination of educational 
neuroscience, and note that educational academics who take a sceptic approach often build 
their arguments around eight concerns. “One set of concerns is scientific; in-principle 
                                                          
26
 The Norwegian educationist Hans Skjervheim published in 1972 the article ‘Errors of the instrumentalism’. 
Skjervheims article has become a renowned criticism towards the positivism and the positivistic venture to 
apply natural scientific methods and philosophies on social aspects.   
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differences in methods, data, theory, and philosophy. The other set of concerns is pragmatic; 
considerations of costs, timing, locus of control, and likely payoffs” (p.140). An elaboration 
on these scientific and pragmatic differences is of significant value, seeing that these aspects 
evolve around „the gap‟ between education on one side and cognitive neuroscience on the 
other. For the moment being, though, descriptions on disciplinary dissimilarities will be put at 
rest. More throughout explanation on these gap-problems will however be provided later in 
the paper, when reluctance towards educational neuroscience is more critically examined.  
 
Hesitant optimism 
In their article, Varma and his colleges (2008) challenge the pessimistic approach, asking if 
the differences between education and neuroscience truly “constitute a fundamentally 
unbridgeable divide?” (ibid. p.141). An answer to this question brings forth the two reminding 
discursive positions. If one starts by looking at the camp labelled hesitant optimism, its 
middle-ground position is evident. On the one hand, these hesitant authors concur with the 
pessimistic sceptics as regards condemnation of neuromyths. On the other hand, they criticise 
the sceptics for their refusal to take brain science into consideration in education. One of the 
foremost educational academics who give the impression to take a hesitating optimistic 
position is John Bruer. Bruer has gained much attention in the educational neuroscience 
debate and his article “Education and the Brain: A bridge too far” (1997), has become a 
noteworthy monument-text in this discourse. In his article, Bruer examine what he calls „the 
neuroscience and education argument‟. Drawing on research on synaptogenesis, critical 
periods, and the effect of enriched environments on synaptic growth, he concludes that a large 
extent of the brain-based educational practice and policy is built upon speculative applications 
of neuroscience (ibid.). “The [idea of] right brain versus the left brain and the educational 
promise of brain based curricula ... are often based on misconceptions and overgeneralizations 
of what we know about the brain, and have little to offer to educators” (p.4). Despite this 
objection, Bruer does not dismiss the idea of „crossing the gap‟ as the pessimists do. On the 
contrary, he argues that “the brain does and should fascinate all of us, and we should find 
advances in neuroscience exiting. As educators, we should also be interested in how basic 
research might contribute to and improve educational practice” (p.15). „The gap‟ between 
education and neuroscience is crossable, and it should be attempted crossed, Bruer argues.  
 
This optimism notwithstanding, Bruer concludes that our knowledge on how the brain works 
is, up till now, not adequate enough to support one bridge (ibid.). Instead Bruer designates the 
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importance of cognitive psychology, and the two bridges which indirectly can link brain 
functions with educational practice. 
 
There is a well-established bridge, now nearly 50 years old, between education and cognitive psychology. 
There is a second bridge, only around 10 years old, between cognitive psychology and neuroscience ... 
Cognitive psychology provides the only firm ground we have to anchor these bridges. It is the only way to 
go if we eventually want to move between education and the brain (ibid. p.4).   
 
Bruer‟s well-known article dates back to 1997 and much have happened in the field of 
educational neuroscience since then. Bruer does, nonetheless, argue for the same middle-step 
also in more recent work. “I do believe that eventually we will be able to bridge neuroscience 
at its various levels of analysis with education,” he notes in 2006, “but I am convinced that all 
of these bridges will have a least one pier on the island of psychology” (p.109). The message 
from the hesitant optimists is clear – „the gap‟ between education and neuroscience ought to 
be crossed, but one single bridge over this gap will be a bridge too far (Bruer, 1997).  
 
Cautious optimism 
Hesitant optimists are not alone in their critics towards brain-based learning industry on one 
side, and the overall disinclination of neuroscience on the other. The camp labelled „cautious 
optimism‟ concurs to these claims (Geake & Cooper, 2003; Petitto & Dunbar, 2004; Ansari et 
al, 2011). Both camps can thus be seen as middle positions in this debate. What then, 
separates the hesitant and the cautious optimists? Looking back at the arguments uttered by 
hesitating optimists, it was stated that “as of now [1997] neuroscience has little to offer 
teachers in terms of informing classroom practice” (Bruer, 1997 p.4). Cautious optimists 
disagree. Instead they claim that neuroscience can inform education, arguing for a significant 
and rapidly increasing neuroscientific knowledge-base (Fischer, Daniel, Immordino-Yang et 
al., 2007).  
 
Bruer (1997) forcefully considered the relevance of neuroscience to education. His conclusion [was] that 
neuroscience is “a bridge too far”... Although it was in his best interest to find connections between the 
disciplines, he found instead poorly drawn extrapolations that inflated neuroscience findings into 
educational neuromyths. Since Bruer‟s cautionary evaluation, a number of commentators have considered 
the prospects for educational neuroscience. Many sound a more optimistic note (Varma et al, 2008 p.140). 
 
Concurrently, where the hesitant argue for two bridges by claiming that educational 
neuroscience in itself is an inadequate link, cautious optimists beg to differ. “Educational 
Neuroscience has the fullest potential to fundamentally advance contemporary educational 
policy and practice – and soon” (Petitto & Dunbar, 2004 p.2). Cautious optimists can 
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therefore be seen to take a more positive approach to educational neuroscience than the camp 
of hesitant optimism. The question which thus follows is; what separates the camp of cautious 
optimists from misguided enthusiasts – both camps do, after all, argue for the importance of 
relating cognitive neuroscience with educational theory and practice?  
 
Whilst misguided enthusiasm often is linked to commercial „brain-based‟ learning industry 
and neuromyths, cautious optimists strongly censure these learning programs for their lack of 
neuroscientific scrutiny (Howard-Jones, 2007). In fact, condemnation of misguided learning 
industries is perhaps never uttered with so vigorous disapproval, as in the camp of cautious 
optimism. The abhorrence is understandable considering that misguided enthusiasts keep 
making an unfavourable repute of the link between education and neuroscience – a link the 
cautious optimists serenely encourage. Goswami (2006) voice this aggravation, stating that 
“neuromyths needs to be eliminated. The dominance of these myths obscure the important 
strides being made by cognitive neuroscience in many areas relevant to education” (p.3). 
Course of action recommended as to „eliminate‟ these unfavourable neuromyths is, as 
Goswami further argue, to strengthen the discipline of educational neuroscience. Not only can 
a scientifically legitimate collaboration abet the endeavour to dispel neuromyths; by doing so, 
one can also direct educational neuroscientific studies towards more beneficial routes (ibid.).  
 
Authors advocating for a cautious optimism do additionally, and forcefully, underline the 
importance of a two-way collaboration between the neuroscientific field and the field of 
education (Fischer et al., 2007). In doing so, they do not only stress the value of education and 
the significant knowledge base educationists have accumulated over the decades (Varma et al, 
2008). They also emphasise the importance of educational practice, so that the enterprise of 
educational neuroscience does not become overruled by theories.  
 
Answering key questions about mind, brain, and education requires reciprocal interaction between 
scientific research and practical knowledge of educators and caregivers. There must be a dynamic 
interaction between scientific research and practical knowledge, with practice shaping scientific questions 
as much as research shapes practice (Fischer et al., 2007 p.1). 
 
Thus, by accentuate reciprocal aspects in educational neuroscience, these academics seek to 
avert neuromyths, prevent educational reductionism under neuroscientific instructions, in 
addition to avert theoretical dominance over practice (ibid.).  
 
Altogether it appear that the camp of cautious optimism separates itself from the three other 
discursive positions by stressing that education and neuroscience are indeed different fields of 
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study, albeit fields which can be bridged with educational neuroscience (Varma et al, 2008). 
Their point is that even if differences in theories, methods, and philosophies create 
limitations, awareness of these limitations is important so as not to draw misguided 
conclusions. More importantly; these limitations are merely limitations, and should not be 
perceived as unsolvable quandaries. Instead one should be conscious about dissimilarities and 
limitations – making issues into possibilities (ibid).   
 
 Bridging the divide that separates the education and neuroscience disciplines requires bridging the 
divide that separates the education and neuroscience communities ... We should remain cautious in our 
optimism. Education research and neuroscience can inform each other, but within limits (ibid. p.149).  
 
The debate – in brief 
Four different discursive positions can be allocated when reviewing the debate on educational 
neuroscience – each position taking a somewhat different approach to the bridging of 
education and neuroscience. Misguided enthusiasm has been associated with neuromyths and 
commercial „brain-based‟ learning industry. This discursive position has consequently been 
profoundly condemned amongst the other three standpoints. The pessimistic sceptics critique 
is founded in their overall reluctance of connecting findings from neuroscience with 
education. Their argument is that differences in theories, methods and philosophies cause a 
gap too immense to successfully be bridged (Varma et al., 2008). These problems are 
noteworthy and the majority in the educational neuroscientific debate acknowledge their 
nature. Although, acknowledging the „dividing-problems‟ do not mean that one rejects the 
linkage of education and cognitive neuroscience. The camp of hesitant optimism, for one, 
argue that this gap should be attempted crossed. Trying to bridge the gap with the discipline 
of educational neuroscience will, however, be a bridge too far (Bruer, 1997). Numerous 
academics can respectably be allocated in these three discoursive positions, albeit the majority 
of the “commentators ... see reasons to be optimistic about the future of educational 
neuroscience” (Varma et al., 2008 p.150). The general opinion in the international debate thus 
appear to be a cautious optimism towards this novel discipline – educational neuroscience can 
bridge the gap between neuroscience and education, albeit a two-way collaboration and a 
cautious awareness are crucial so as to make this transdisciplinary field academically 
adequate (Howard-Jones, 2011).  
 
This thesis has, up until now, focused on a discursive review over different positions, their 
ideologies, and the relationship between them. A critical discourse analysis elaborates, asking 
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if there are additional factors contributing in the shaping of the discourse. By scrutinizing 
further one can ask why neuromyths managed to gained acceptance in the first place, why is 
there so profound reluctance amongst the sceptics in taking neuroscientific findings into 
consideration, is there something else lying underneath these ideologies, and is there a 
possibility that the debate on educational neuroscience is a discursive strain drawn from a 
larger, interdiscursive dispute? The following chapter will elaborate on these and similar 
questions, as this discourse analysis take a more critical approach to educational neuroscience.  
 
5. Problems of ‘the gap’ – why reluctance among some educationists?  
Most academics who have taken an interest in the international debate on educational 
neuroscience seem to hold a cautious optimism towards this new discipline (Varma et al., 
2008). Even those who take a more hesitant position stress the importance of taking brain-
science into consideration (Bruer, 1997). These authors have nevertheless met profound 
reluctance amongst some educational academics who claim that neuroscience and education 
cannot be connected (Varma et al, 2008). Debates which have followed have mainly consisted 
of the optimistic camps trying to induce sceptics by drawing on impressive fMRI studies and 
mindboggling arguments. Despite the optimists strive to convince the pessimists, there seem 
to have been, at least until recently, few who have asked why one can find such profound 
reluctance amongst some academics in the first place. An all-through answer to this question 
will, certainly, imply a complexity and an extent which this thesis does not hold. This chapter 
does, nevertheless, strive to provide some analytic perspectives on the matter.  
 
By critically reviewing and analysing the discourse of educational neuroscience, I will argue 
that one can classify reluctance being voiced into two different categories – categories I have 
chosen to label „the peripheral gap‟ and „the underlying gap‟. The former is critiques 
commonly uttered towards „explicit‟ difficulties bridging education and neuroscience. The 
latter, and slightly „deeper‟ gap, can give the impression being associated with more implicit 
problems concerning the bridging of these two fields. The following sections will be 
structured accordingly, using the illustration of a peripheral and an underlying gap as to 
demonstrate the different „levels‟ of reluctance. An additionally aspiration of mine is to see if 
the „problems of the gap‟ can be linked to other discourses, and how educational neuroscience 
endeavours to bridge these divide. Expectantly this approach will reveal some of the core 
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structures, ideologies, conflicts, hierarchy, and interdiscursive relationships in the discourse of 
educational neuroscience. 
 
The peripheral gap – problems and possibilities 
Reluctance towards educational neuroscience can be seen related with what I have labelled 
„the peripheral gap‟. The reason why I have chosen to label this a peripheral gap is that 
aspects which can be categorized in this group often are apparent and well acknowledged 
problems in the educational neuroscience discourse. Advocates in different discursive 
positions are aware of these concerns and how they „create‟ a divide between the educational 
discipline on one hand and the discipline of neuroscience on the other. Varma, McCandliss, 
and Schwartz (2008) and Willingham (2009) have elaborated upon some of these „obvious‟ 
problems. Drawing on their articles, this section will highlight three aspects – the problems 
with neuromyths, educational de-professionalization, and vertical and horizontal problems – 
which can contribute to explain some of the censure towards educational neuroscience.  
 
The problems with neuromyths  
One peripheral aspect which can explain the reluctance towards educational neuroscience lies, 
as previously mentioned, in neuromyths and the „brain-based‟ learning industry. Skeptics‟ 
censorious of these misguided myths are understandable. Misguided enthusiasts leap, first of 
all, too quickly from cognitive models of the brain and mind to recommendations for 
classroom practice; often without consulting experts in neuroscience or education. This leads 
to neuromyths since these cognitive models rarely are built upon adequate links between 
brain-mind-behavior (Howard-Jones, 2007). Secondly, brain-based learning industries convert 
these neuromyths to step-by-step formulas, consequently transforming neuromyths into 
tempting and easy understandable recipes for „what works‟ in classrooms27. These 
neuromyths have therefore managed to get roothold amongst teachers, and in its wake spread 
misconceptions of the brain, mind, and how cognitive models can improve educational 
practice. A third aspect which can be mentioned is that the brain-based industry profits on 
selling these inadequate „learning-programs‟ to ignorant teachers (ibid.). Subsequently, these 
                                                          
27
 Problems with misguided neuromyths and over-enthusiastic teaching-programs can also be linked to the 
critique evidence-based education has met in Norway. Both evidence-based and brain-based programs are 
commonly linked to unfavorable and poorly drawn scientific assumptions. However, and this is important to 
note, the term ‘evidence based education’ have often fallen under miss-translation in Norway. This is because 
the term commonly is misunderstood as ‘universal step-by-step formulas’ for ‘what works’ and not as 
scientifically grounded education. For more reading about this topic, see Ogden (2008). 
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misguided programs cause aversion and reluctance towards crossing „the gap‟ between 
education and neuroscience (Varma et al., 2008).  
 
Advocates promoting educational neuroscience have met the skeptics‟ critique, but not by 
trying to defend the neuromyths. Instead they coincide with the pessimists and concur with 
their disinclination (ibid.). “The current gulf between neuroscience and education is being 
filled by packages and programmes claiming to be based on brain science. The speed with 
which such packages have gained widespread currency in school is astonishing” Goswami 
(2006) note, before stating that “these neuromyths need to be eliminated” (p.3). Critique 
towards misguided learning industry is distinct – not only from the skeptic camp, but also 
from the optimists. The shared critique notwithstanding; it appears that the skeptics censure 
towards neuromyths and the brain-based learning industry contribute to reluctance to the 
entire discipline of educational neuroscience.  
 
In itself this explanation as regards neuromyths is a sufficient justification for some of the 
reluctance – neuromyths and misguided learning industry are, by and large, perceived as 
highly unfavorable for education. However, this account seems to leave more questions 
unanswered than what it actually tries to counter. A more critical approach seeks further 
inquiry: The reluctance towards educational neuroscience can be viewed as one consequence 
of neuromyths, but what are the sources of these myths? What triggered the brain-based 
teaching industry in the first place? How did these misguided programs become so popular 
amongst teachers, and why do these myths hold so much power in the educational 
neuroscience discourse? Goswami (2006) have elaborated on the problems concerning 
neuromyths, and claims that the success of brain-based industries first of all lies in the general 
request for „scientific facts‟ and pleas for „what works‟. The problem, however  
 
is that neuroscientist may not be those best placed to communicate with teachers in any sustained way 
… Most teachers prefer broad brush messages with a „big picture‟, and being „told what works‟. 
Neuroscientist are not necessarily gifted at communication with society at large, and they are 
appropriately cautious about saying that something „works‟(p.6).  
  
With their alluring teaching-programs, the „brain-based‟ learning industry consequently 
became an “answer” to the common requisite for „the best‟ teaching program (ibid.). Not only 
do these misguided enthusiasts claim to connect cognitive neuroscience with education; they 
also promote comprehensible teaching programs ready to be applied in every classrooms 
(Howard-Jones, 2007). The influence and power such promises hold are not difficult to 
imagine. Not only can the misguided learning-industry seem to hold power due to its alluring 
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remedies for „perfect‟ teaching practices; it can also appear that these promises strengthen and 
extend the neuromyths roothold amongst educationists (Goswami, 2006).  
Varma and his colleagues (2008) support Goswamis argument, but do additionally note that 
the very existence of neuromyths tells us something important: People are fascinated by the 
brain and how knowledge of the brain can aid better teaching and learning. Had there not been 
any interest in the first place, brain-based learning industries would probably never have 
gained such power. There is an inclination to take cognitive neuroscientific findings into 
consideration amongst teachers, this plea should be taken into consideration (ibid.). What is 
important, however, is that one should prevent misguided enthusiasts to make profit on 
teachers‟ interest by promoting invalid brain-based programs (OECD, 2007b).  
 
It may be of most use to society if we as scientists foster and support a network of communicators of our 
research – individuals who can bridge the current gulf between neuroscience and education by providing 
high-quality knowledge in a digestible form ... [I]t might, ultimately, be of most value to society if we 
empower our own middlemen, communicators who know who to consult for expert advice on the latest 
claims of the brain-based learning industry, and who are clearly working in the public interest and not for 
profit. A network of such communicators would serve us all (and our children), and would prevent society 
from pouring precious educational resources into scientifically spurious applications (Goswami, 2006 p.7). 
 
Advocates in educational neuroscience thus seek to solve the problems of neuromyths by 
offering a transdisciplinary academic field with trustworthy middlemen. Not only can this 
collaborating field of educational neuroscience contribute to eliminate misguided 
assumptions; the discipline can also replace these myths with more scientific and legitimate 
contributions connecting education and neuroscience.  
 
Educational de-professionalization  
Educational neuroscience is by some educational academics viewed as a possible threat to the 
educational discipline and profession. Seeing that this new transdisciplinary field connects 
cognitive neuroscience with educational practice, it has been claimed that the collaboration 
will become a top-down relationship – neuroscience looming on top, whilst education takes a 
negligible role (Varma et al., 2008). Consequently this has created a general concern that 
neuroscientists will end up with all control, cannibalize the educational field, and de-
professionalize educational academics. These concerns can again indicate apprehensions 
related to reductionism. Considering that every discipline strives to maintain their academic 
position, reluctance towards educational neuroscience is understandable enough if this 
discipline is perceived correlated with de-professionalization.  
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The counter-argument being uttered amongst the optimists, however, is that this assumption 
of asymmetry is incorrect. One of the foremost goals of educational neuroscience is to initiate 
a two-way collaboration where neuroscience informs education in unison as education 
informs neuroscience (Geake & Cooper, 2003; Fischer et al., 2007; Howard-Jones, 2007).  
 
[A] cognitive neuroscience-education nexus should be a two-way street … Whereas cognitive neuroscience 
could inform education by providing additional evidence that confirms good practice, helps resolve 
educational dilemmas, or suggests new possibilities in pedagogy or curriculum design, education could 
inform cognitive neuroscience by providing a source of complementary behavioural data, especially on 
children, as well as posing new worthwhile lines of investigation (Geake, 2005 p.12). 
 
Educational neuroscience therefore endeavors to bridge „the gap‟ between the disciplines by 
creating a two-way alliance. In doing so, they attempt to construct a partnership where neither 
of the two cannibalize the other profession. Whether educational neuroscience manages to 
prevent an educational de-professionalization or not, is another inquiry. The success of this 
commission relies, in part, upon both fields willingness to equivalent collaborations.  
 
Vertical and horizontal problems 
Other aspects which can be labelled under „the peripheral gap‟ are vertical and horizontal 
problems. These two aspects are mentioned by Willingham (2009), and can be seen to 
encompass what Varma and colleagues (2008) call differences in method, data, and theories. 
The argument being raised by the camp of reluctant sceptics is that these differences create an 
unbridgeable gap between education and neuroscience. First of all is the method used in the 
two disciplines profoundly different, as neuroscientific methods do not take consideration to 
contextual and cultural factors important for education (ibid.). Willingham (2009) refers to the 
differences in method as „the vertical problem‟, pointing out how this different „levels of 
analysis‟ creates problems linking education and neuroscience.  
 
The information that education researcher most often try to import from neuroscience concerns a single 
cognitive process in isolation, but the interactions with other systems will be part of the educational 
context (ibid. p.545).  
 
Secondly; differences in methods also result in differences in data. The problem is that sterile 
neuroscience laboratory studies provide data connecting aspects of cognition to different brain 
networks, but how can these data inform education. “[K]nowing the location of an elementary 
cognitive function tells us nothing about how to design instruction for teaching that function, 
just as knowing where the alternator resides in an engine tells us nothing about how to teach 
driving” (Varma et al., 2008 p.142). The third problem which can be a cause to the reluctance 
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found amongst some educational academics is the differences in theories. Varma and his 
colleagues (2008) note how a discipline‟s theories contribute to a certain way to talk, 
categorize, and make meaning to its field of study. 
 
Every science evolves an appropriate vocabulary that supports meaningful generalizations within the 
domain of study while avoiding irrelevant distinctions. The vocabulary of education supports the 
description of learning as it occurs inside and outside classrooms. Neuroscience is a lower level science 
than education, and its vocabulary is therefore too microscopic to support useful generalizations for 
education (ibid. p.142).  
 
Consequently difference in theory creates a vocabulary-gap between education and 
neuroscience. This problem is by Willingham (2009) defined as the „horizontal problem‟, as it 
creates translation-problems between the two fields. The focal point is that this theoretical gap 
initiates reductionism, as it tries to reduce one field of study to the other (Choudhury et al., 
2009). 
 
Differences related to method, data and theory engender problems and consequently source 
reluctance towards educational neuroscience. How then, do the optimistic advocates try to 
bridge this gap? In their article, Varma and his colleagues (2008) attempt crossing the division 
by turning each of the issues into opportunities. First, where the sceptics argue that 
neuroscientific methods are of no use in education, optimists beg to differ. ”Innovative 
designs can allow neuroscience to study the effects of variables of interest to education, such 
as context” (ibid., p.144). Blakemore, Winston, and Firth (2004) concur: 
 
It may once have seemed foolhardy to work out connections between fundamental neurophysiological 
mechanisms and highly complex social behaviour, let alone to decide whether the mechanisms are specific 
to social processes. However ... neuroimaging studies have provided some encouraging examples (p.216). 
 
Instead of discharging new methods in the study of education, optimists try to look at the 
possibilities these new tools can provide. Even if most educational academics do not hold the 
knowledge on how to best apply these new tools, an educational neuroscientific collaboration 
can aid employing these methods so as to generate profitable educational research (Varma et 
al., 2008). Secondly, when it comes to differences in data the optimist use similar argument, 
claiming that “neuroscience data suggest different analysis of cognition and may therefore 
imply new kinds of instructional theories” (ibid. p.144). Instead of using a direct link from 
neuroscientific findings to educational theory and practice, optimists call for new kinds of 
theories combining these two fields (Howard-Jones, 2011). The third problem regarding 
differences in macro- and micro theories and how this create reductionism, is opposed by 
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claiming that “reductionism is a unifying principle of science: The macroscopic terms of 
coarse-grain science are coordinated with the microscopic term of fine-grain science. This is 
the time-honored process by which the sciences are stitched together ... What is problematic is 
eliminative reductionism “(Varma et al., 2008 p.145). Reductionism itself is not the problem; 
problems only arise if neuroscientific explanations replace behavioural explanations 
(Choudhury et al., 2009). Educational neuroscience averts this by avoiding direct links from 
neuroscience to educational practice and theory. Instead it is stressed, again and again, that 
educational neuroscience is a reciprocal collaboration. Neuroscientific findings do not replace 
education, instead cognitive neuroscience function as a supplementary ground which can 
anchor and enrich educational explanations.  
 
Biology provides a good example of how to maintain levels of analysis with a reductionist paradigm. It 
makes a corridor of explanations from molecular biology all the way up to ecology and zoology. 
Explanations at lower levels are consistent with those at higher levels but do not replace them. Rather, 
their relationships are complementary and supplementary ... One can imagine an analogous corridor of 
explanations from neuroscience to education (Varma et al., 2008 p.145). 
 
 
„Vertical‟ and „horizontal‟ differences, together with the problems as regards neuromyths and 
the assumption of an educational de-professionalization, can explain some of the reluctance 
educational neuroscience has met. These aspects can furthermore be viewed as components 
creating a peripheral gap between the disciplines of education and neuroscience. What is 
interesting when analysing this peripheral gap is that many of these problems indicate, as we 
have seen, a general aversion to reductionism. Censure of neuromyths, de-professionalization, 
differences in theory, data, and method – they all encompass troubled visions where education 
fall, in one way or the other, under neuroscientific instruct. If one links this reluctance to 
censure previously aimed towards positivistic approaches in education, another echelon of 
reluctance appears to be uncovered: History of positivism in education do not only witness of 
an approach where social studies were reduced by forcing them to subject to natural scientific 
methods and philosophies (Choudhury et al., 2009). The positivistic approach also 
endeavoured to uncover objective truths, gave theory precedence over practice, and interfered 
with well established boundaries between social and natural science (Telhaug & Mediås, 
2003). As such, positivism was committed of the crime of reductionism and the approach 
became condemned under the label „errors of instrumentalism‟ (ibid.). Whilst the years have 
elapsed, negative connotations linked to educational reductionism and positivism have not 
ceased to exist. Considering that the discipline of educational neuroscience can, at least on the 
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first note, bear resemblance with positivistic endeavours, sceptic aversion is more 
understandable.  
 
Even if one can draw parallels between positivist approaches and the discipline of educational 
neuroscience, claiming that educational neuroscience commits to the same errors of 
reductionism as the positivists did in the 50s and 60s, is decidedly debatable. Previous 
positivistic attempts give the impression to fall into the commitment of two major errors: 
First, on has the error of allocating theory a supremacy over practice. Secondly, one has the 
danger of reductionism by forcing educational theories and practice into a position lined 
directly under natural scientific theories (Goswami, 2006). Favouring theory over practice and 
applying direct submissions from cognitive theories to educational practice can, indeed, 
appear to be the case with neuromyths and misguided brain-based learning industry (ibid.). It 
will, however, be an over-generalisation to assign such offences also to the discipline of 
educational neuroscience. If one examines the aims and goals of educational neuroscience, it 
becomes evident that this discipline not only condemns neuromyths‟ direct links, educational 
neuroscience also attempts to prevent reductionism by stressing the importance of reciprocal 
collaboration. As OECD (2007b) concluded in their project on educational neuroscience:  
 
Recent advances in neuroscience have produced powerful insight while educational research has 
accumulated a substantial knowledge base. A neuroscientific perspective adds a new, important dimension 
to the study of learning in education, and educational knowledge could help direct neuroscience research 
towards more relevant areas ... A new trans-disciplinarity is needed which brings the different communities 
and perspective together. This needs it to be a reciprocal relationship ... Educational neuroscience can help 
to drive the creation of a real learning science (p.12f). 
 
Moreover; when educational neuroscience is met with reluctance due to problem caused by 
dissimilarities in theories, methods and philosophies, cautious optimists do not oppose to 
these dissimilarities. On the contrary; instead of contradict their sceptic opponents by 
rejecting differences between the discipline of educational and neuroscience, advocates of 
educational neuroscience concede to this „gap‟ (Howard-Jones, 2007). Not merely do they 
acknowledge „the gap‟; advocates in educational neuroscience aim to accentuate these 
differences. To prevent too hasty drawn and erroneous mistakes the „divides‟ and 
dissimilarities separating the fields are instead elaborated on (Varma et al, 2008).  
 
[T]eachers need to become „neuroscience literate‟; and, by the same token, cognitive neuroscientists need 
to become „education literate‟ in order for strong links to be forged between fields ...We content that this 
can be achieved by moving beyond thinking about the direct application of neuroscience research results to 
classroom practice towards thinking about the constrains that need to be set in place in order to bring 
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educators and neuroscientist together to collaborate and inform each other‟s thinking and practice. It will be 
important to communicate the potential and promise of such indirect links to policy makers, funding 
agencies, and universities (Ansari et al., 2011 p.41).  
 
By emphasising dissimilarities between the two disciplines, it looks like advocates of 
educational neuroscience evade the errors of reductionism. Not only can awareness of 
disciplinary dissimilarities craft reciprocated collaboration; awareness of dissimilarities also 
underlines the importance of taking a cautious approach so as to sufficiently bridge the gap 
between the two academic fields.  
 
This chapter has, insofar, examined what I have chosen to label „the peripheral gap‟, since 
problems allocated here are suggestive of „obvious‟ problems related to „the gap‟ between the 
discipline of education and cognitive neuroscience. A review of educational neuroscience 
could stop here; a critical discourse analysis however, takes the analysis further. The question 
which follows is thus; are these aspects mentioned above the source of the reluctance, or is 
there something concealed underneath the surface? Is the „gap-problem‟ between education 
and neuroscience merely a strain and a consequence of a more profound conflict? 
 
The underlying gap  
A crucial aim for critical discourse analysis is to illuminate how intern discursive structures 
are related to the web of extern interdiscursive connections (Jäger & Maier, 2009). An 
elaboration on interdiscursive relations in the discourse of educational neuroscience is thus 
apposite. In addition to this analysis on interdiscursive relations, I will here also argue that 
these connections create an „underlying gap‟ which can be seen as an additionally source to 
the profound reluctance which occasionally is voiced as regards the discipline of educational 
neuroscience. My argument goes as follows:  
 
Numerous authors have pointed to the „obvious fact‟ that education can be classified as a 
social science whilst neuroscience is a natural science (Geake & Cooper, 2003; Varma et al, 
2008). If one consents upon the link between education and social science and between 
neuroscience and natural science, I will allege that an additional account can be made. This 
account can be linked to Foucault‟s idea of „orders of discourse‟, and Faircloughs (1992) 
elaborated term „interdiscourse‟. The focal point in both concepts is that discourses are 
connected (ibid.). This accordingly implies that educational neuroscience can be seen 
entangled with other related discourses. Seeing its transdisciplinary position, one can 
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therefore argue that educational neuroscience is profoundly connected to a social science 
discourse on one side and a natural science discourse on the other.  
 
Foucault and Fairclough take the concept of „orders of discourse‟ further, and argue that 
discourses entangled in one another can affect one another. This implies that the way one 
think, talk, and operate in one discourse, can impinge on how people in a connected discourse 
perceive, represent, and act upon this world (Fairclough, 1992). “What applies for boundaries 
between subject positions and associated discursive conventions applies generally for 
elements of orders of discourse. It applies also for boundaries between distinct orders of 
discourse” (ibid. p.69). Accordingly this indicates that different positions, ideologies, and 
boundaries in the discourse of social science will influence the educational discourse, whilst 
the discourse of natural science conversely will affect neuroscience. What is interesting is 
that educational neuroscience is a transdisciplinary field and consequently tries to cross these 
boundaries. As previously stated it is precisely this „bridging of the gap‟, the crossings of 
discoursive boundaries, which creates debate – a debate which chiefly has evolved around 
problems linked to the crossing of „the peripheral gap‟ between education and neuroscience.  
 
Following this, I will make my crucial point; Foucault and Fairclough claim that a discourse 
connected to another will be influenced of this discourse‟s structures (Fairclough, 1992). 
Seeing the strong links between educational neuroscience and social science on one hand and 
natural science on the other, this must therefore imply that different positions, ideologies, 
boundaries, and conflicts found in the discourse of educational neuroscience have 
connections to similar aspects between natural and social science. In other words; the 
„peripheral gap‟ located between education and neuroscience can be seen connected to „the 
gap‟ located between social science and natural science. Struggles and conflicts uttered in the 
long-established dispute between natural and social science can thus be expected to seep 
through to the educational neuroscience discourse and inflict structures of this debate. If this 
assumption is correct, it must therefore be of most significance to consider and review 
conflicts between natural and social science, if on fully wants to comprehend underlying and 
deeply embedded structures in the educational neuroscience debate. 
 
Before I elaborate on the dissidence between natural and social science, two additional 
reminders must be made. First of all it must be noted that Foucault talks about an order of 
discourses (Foucault, 1970). Considering that education and neuroscience are minor 
disciplines extracted from more profound academic fields of respectively social and natural 
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science, the hierarchic positioning is distinctive. The „gap‟ between social and natural science 
can therefore be seen as „an underlying gap‟ which the peripheral educational neuroscience 
gap is founded on. What is important to stress, is that these two „gaps‟ do not imply two 
separated gaps which both lies between the educational and the neuroscientific fields of 
study. It is the same „gap‟ I am referring to, albeit viewed at different levels of analysis. The 
„peripheral gap‟ could thus be understood as a gulf viewed at a discursive analytic level, 
whilst the „underlying gap‟ is an interdiscursive gulf. The reason why I have chosen to 
represent these problems using illustration of „a gap‟ is due to the eminent „gap-metaphor‟ 
already used in the discourse of educational neuroscience. I thus spin further on this 
illustration, drawing interdiscoursive connections to extensive contexts.  
 
What secondly is important to note is that by using the label „underlying‟, I suggest precisely 
that – there is reason to assume that this gap often is imperceptible. This notion is built upon 
another central point in Foucauldian discourse theory – the relationship between discourse, 
knowledge, and power. “Discourses”, Jäger and Maier (2009) state, “exercise power in a 
society because they institutionalize and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting” (p.35). 
These discoursive structures which shape consciousness and reality are furthermore not 
always apparent for individuals (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). What this implies is that 
interdiscoursive connections between the structure of educational neuroscience and those of 
social and natural science, not necessarily are obvious to its advocates. The links are, on the 
other hand, what Foucault calls abstract and underlying structures which “transport 
knowledge on which collective and individual consciousness feeds. This knowledge is the 
basis for individual and collective, discursive and non-discursive action, which in turn shapes 
reality” (Jäger & Maier, 2009 p.39). The illustration of an „underlying gap‟ found between 
social and natural science thus serve its purpose, as it insinuate underlying conflicts which to 
a certain extent influence the educational neuroscience debate. Nonetheless, this does not 
essentially mean that individuals are entirely unaware these underlying conflicts. All the 
same; the topic is not frequently addressed. 
 
The conflict between natural and social science 
Critical discourse analysis aims to elucidate underlying and imperceptible discursive and 
interdiscursive structures concealed from the discourse‟s own inhabitants (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 1999). Thus far my approach to the discourse of educational neuroscience has tried 
to make some of these structures more apparent – for instance the interdiscursive relationship 
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between the peripheral educational neuroscience gap and the more profound gap between 
natural and social science. However, merely claiming that such a link exists does not provide 
any explanations for reluctance aimed towards educational neuroscience. If one wants to 
elaborate further as regards ideologies in the educational neuroscience debate, a more 
throughout review of the conflicts between natural and social science is required. An 
examination of interdiscoursive connections between educational neuroscience and natural 
and social science, led me to become aware of one eminent conflict – the dissidence between 
nature and nurture. This nature-nurture conflict goes far back in the history of natural and 
social science, but do nevertheless persist creating prominent debates in academia 
(Choudhury et al, 2009). The next section will thus try to critically review the dispute between 
natural and social science, between nature and nurture, with the aim to elucidate the depth of 
the „gap‟ and reluctance connected to it.  
 
The division between natural and social science is an ancient gap and has been the origin to 
numerous conflicts throughout the history of science. Newtonian physics bickered with 
Aristotelian physics (Campbell, 2011), Darwin‟s neuroscientific account opposed to Boas 
sociological view (Degler, 1991), realism contests constructivism (Choudhury et al., 2009), 
materialistic perspective conflicts idealistic (Campbell, 2011), and the individual brain is seen 
as opposed to the collective mind (ibid; Immordino-Yang, 2011). Different names 
notwithstanding, these conflicts can be seen as to evolve around the same profound divide – a 
divide which in brief, and simplistically explained, can appear extracted from different 
answers given to the question „what cause individual differences‟? On one side of the conflict 
the answer is nature – the camp which allocates biological factors a deterministic role in the 
shaping of human behaviour and physical traits. On the other side, however, the answer is 
nurture – the camp which claims that individual change, behavioural qualities, and physical 
differences are caused by social and environmental factors (Johnston, 2007). These different 
camps have insofar held profound different philosophies as regards ontological and 
epistemological questions, and have consequently created a vast gap stretching through the 
scenery of science – dividing the field of natural science from the field of social science. 
Encompassing a range of different problems, this profound nature-nurture gap is too vast to 
fully investigate in this thesis. I will however, try to elaborate on one aspect in this conflict – 
that is the dispute between biological factors and societal environments as a cause for 
individual change; an aspect which also is highly relevant for the educational neuroscience 
discourse.  
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History of science evinces a repetition as regards the notion of taking biological factors into 
consideration in social science. What further can be noted is that biological explanation 
chiefly has met reluctance in social academic fields (Bergesen, 2004). As to explicate this 
tendency in the overall scientific discourse, I will here draw upon theories to Carl N. Degler. 
In his book „In search of human nature; the decline and revival of Darwinism in American 
Social Thought‟ (1991), Degler reviews the history of „social thought‟ and how this is 
embedded in social science
28. One of his focal point is that „nurture‟ has gained power over 
„nature‟ in social science as the years have elapsed. According to Degler, biological aspects 
was questioned already in 1900 and the emphasis was instead “placed upon the role of social 
environment in bringing about physical and other changes” (p.66). This is also in accordance 
to C.P. Snow (1959; 1963). “As a cultural anxiety, concern about the divide between the „two 
cultures‟29 essentially dates from the nineteenth century, and the modern form of this anxiety 
would have been barley intelligible in earlier periods” (p.ix). In the years which followed the 
reliance upon historical factors and cultural influence increased, whilst internal and biological 
explanations for human behaviour became less prominent. Alfred Kroeber, a prominent 
sociologist at the time, even proclaimed the necessity of a total separation between social 
science and biology (Degler, 1991). Later, in 1950, Durkheim the „father of sociology‟ 
exclaimed that “the determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts 
preceding it and not among the states of individual consciousness” (Durkheim in Varma et al, 
2008 p.143). Twenty years later, the Norwegian sociologist Hans Skjervheim criticised the 
previous positivistic reliance upon technical rationality in social science, claiming that using 
natural scientific methods in human studies was an „error of instrumentalism‟ (Telhaug & 
Mediås, 2003). Even recently, the prominent sociologist Griswold (1994) stated that “biology 
or our own nature gives little direction to our lives, so we have to develop our own guideline, 
and we do so in the course of our interactions with one another” (Griswold in Bergesen, 
2004). The prominence of nurture in social thought is clear. The question, however, is why 
this profound change occurred? Why have numerous academics in social science so 
                                                          
28
 It must be noted that Degler write from an American point of view. Aspects of his theory on ‘social thought’ 
can therefore to some extent differ from the history of ‘social thought’ in for instance Europe.  
29
 When Snow (1959; 1963) talks about ‘the two cultures’ he refers to “Literary intellectuals at one pole – at the 
other scientist” (p:4). These two cultures are what we today call humanities and sciences (Collini in Snow 1959; 
1963). Education as a social science, one can argue, do not fit in any of these ‘two cultures’ but can instead be 
categorizes as ‘a third culture’. Snows elaboration on the “gulf of mutual incomprehension” can, nevertheless, 
readily be linked to the gap between natural and social science, and thus function as a demonstration on the 
discourses profound conflicts. As Collini note: “At the heart of the concept of the ‘two cultures’ is a claim about 
academic disciplines ... the divide between two sorts of intellectual enquiry” (ibid. p:xliii). 
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reluctantly taken biological research into consideration, and why did this „gap‟ between 
natural science and social science emerge in the first place?  
 
“The triumph of culture across the spectrum of the social science”, as Degler (1991) calls it, 
was due to an increased societal call for democracy, the ideology of equality, and the belief in 
self-determination (p.187ff)
30
. From the early 1900 and through the century which followed, 
these egalitarian ideas had particular strong influences on the society at large – an egalitarian 
ideology which the history of racism, the holocaust, and the Great Depression strengthened 
(ibid.). As a consequence, biological theories drawn on genetic explanations were perceived a 
„threat‟ to these ideas.  
 
[O]ne of the prominent objections to eugenics was that people did not want to believe in the importance of 
heredity on the ground that it is a pessimistic and fatalistic doctrine ... [T]he environmental explanation was 
preferable, whenever justified by the data, because it was more optimistic, holding out the hope of 
improvement (ibid. p.188). 
 
Genetic accounts challenged ideals of societal equality and „deprived‟ humans the possibility 
of self-effort as to create changes in their lives. As a result, by the 1930‟s leading social 
scientist disclaimed biological and hereditarian explanations in favour for environmental and 
cultural aspects as a cause for individual change (ibid.). This „gap‟ between nature and nurture 
has accordingly influenced the sociological discourse ever since. Bergesen (2004) elaborates 
upon this, stating that the hypothesis of „society as the latest origin of mind‟ has been 
profoundly canonical eminent in sociological theory
31
.   
 
From Mead and Cooley to the present, sociological theory endlessly repeats the hypothesis of a lack of 
significant cognitive structure before socialization ... Humans are not born social; we have to be socialized. 
We have to learn what it means to be human. Which particular aspect of society performs this work varies 
by preference of theorist: Durkheim emphasized totemic rites; G.H. Mead, symbolic interaction; Talcott 
Parsons, primary socialization through family; Bourdieu, habituated social behaviours; Gramsci, 
worldviews, Althusser, the ideological state apparatus, Foucault, bodies of institutionalized knowledge; and 
so forth. What is in the mind is what society has put there (ibid. p.397). 
 
Drawing on Foucauldian discourse theory, one can claim that these sociological theories 
consequently has shaped, and been shaped by, the way one think and act in the social science 
                                                          
30
 Here it can be note that Norway has eminent and strong-held traditions of equality and social democracy. 
Question thus intriguing to ask, is if this will imply more profound reluctance towards biology in Norwegian 
social science? Is this why the debate on educational neuroscience is missing amongst educational academics in 
Norway? And can this also be linked to the strong reluctance one can find amongst Norwegian educational 
academics as regards ‘evidence based’ teaching and practice? I will leave these questions to linger, since this 
master thesis does not hold enough pages so as elaborate. 
31
 The ‘triumph of culture’ from the mid 20
th
 century can also contribute to explain why socio-constructivist 
learning theories (e.g. that of Vygotsky) have managed to maintain such a significant position in education. 
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discourse (Neumann, 2001). Neumann further states that “when a representation is moderately 
unchallenged in a discourse, it exist a state of hegemony. As any other situation, this 
hegemony has to be maintained by discoursive work; that is production of statements and 
practices which constantly confirm these representations” (p.178 [my translation]). The 
repeated acceptance of the representation of „society as the latest origin of mind‟ can thus be 
seen as holding profound hegemonic power in the sociological discourse. However, the power 
of hegemony is not necessarily everlasting.  
 
One can argue that the „nurture over nature‟ hegemony in the sociological discourse has, once 
again, started to waver. There are numerous reasons behind this claim. One can first of all 
argue, as previously mentioned, that new technologies has unlocked the box of the mysterious 
brain and in this wake new cognitive models of the mind has been crafted.  Secondly one can 
find a general inclination in both politics and in the society at large, towards more scientific 
findings and research (Ansari et al., 2011). Popular-science books are mounting and scientific 
article is recited in media. Even international organisations with significant political influence 
such as OECD, empathises the importance of taking scientific studies into consideration in 
more sociological fields such as education (OECD, 2007b). Thirdly; there is not only in 
politics and in general societal concerns one can witness this inclination; similar tendency to 
take more consideration to nature and biology is also to be found in academia (Ansari et al, 
2011). As a result, debate has arisen and critiques have been aimed towards the deep-rooted 
sociological „thought of mind‟. Bergesen (2004) ends his articles by stating that “the 
Durkheimian theory of the social origin of mind has little empirical support and suggests that 
the sociology of mental life needs to be radically retheorized” (p.395); whilst Johnston (2007) 
close his article by stating that recent gene-studies “require us to re-think long-standing ideas 
about constancy and variability in behavior and to re-evaluate the idea of „nature‟ as 
something fixed and unalterable” (p.126). Numerous academics concur to these critiques, and 
authors such as DiMaggio (1997), Cerulo (2009), and Choudhury and colleagues (2009) 
question the sociological favour of nurture in the „thought of mind‟. What is more, and what 
is highly relevant for this thesis, is the conclusion all these authors craft. Even if they criticize 
the strong hold nurture has over the sociological academic field, they do not oppose this 
nurture-hegemony by calling forth an equal powerful nature-hegemony which can conquest 
the supremacy. Instead, all these authors argue for „a bridging of the gap‟ between nature and 
nurture, between biological explanations and environmental explanations, and between 
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natural science and social science (DiMaggio, 1997; Bergesen, 2004; Johnston, 2007; Cerulo, 
2009; Choudhury et al., 2009).  
 
One way to avoid thinking of culture as inscribed in the brain, but to acknowledge social and cultural 
context, is to break down the dichotomy between nature and culture ... and to incorporate findings about 
cortical plasticity to view the brain as in constant interaction with culture and consider how „meaning and 
mechanism‟ intersect via the brain (Choudhury et al., 2009 p.71). 
 
The resemblance to the educational neuroscience debate is prominent. Resemblance to 
educational neuroscience is not only prominent, it also underlines the assumptions I have 
made earlier – different positions, ideologies, boundaries, and conflicts found in the discourse 
of educational neuroscience have connections to similar aspects between natural and social 
science. The „peripheral gap‟ located between education and neuroscience can thus be seen as 
connected to the more profound „gap‟ between social and natural science – both discourses 
holding a shared and deep-rooted reluctance towards biological explanations (Degler, 1991; 
Immordino-Yang, 2011). As to illustrate this connection between the educational-
neuroscience „gap‟ and the underlying gap between natural and social science, I will here 
allude to the concept of „deterministic roofs‟. It is usually pessimistic sceptics who have 
voiced such critics, claiming that cognitive neuroscientific studies are highly unfavourable 
since they determine what students can or cannot do. These critiques towards „the destiny of 
biology‟ have mainly been voiced as regards neuroscientific studies on ADHA, dyslexia and 
dyscalculia (Howard-Jones, 2007).  
 
The existence of differences in brain structure or function between different groups of learners may inspire 
insight and contribute to more effective learning programmes and inventions. However, it can also lead to 
unhelpful notions of permanent deficits and of ceilings to performance that are biological determined ... 
[This] demonstrate how easily biological knowledge becomes incorrectly and unhelpfully associated with 
deterministic ideas (ibid. p.21). 
 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) show to similar trends in academia, noting how new neuro-
scientific findings have caused assumptions of an scientific denial of „free will‟ (Vohs and 
Schooler in Choudhury et al., 2009 p.63). Advocates for educational neuroscience beg to 
differ, biology is not destiny (ibid.; Howard-Jones, 2007). On the contrary; new cognitive 
neuroscientific findings stresses the importance social factors has in the shaping of the 
individual mind (Choudhury, 2009; Ferrari, 2011). By stating this, the gap between  
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environment and biology, between education and neuroscience, and between sociology and 
natural science is attempted crossed.   
 
Evidence from social and affective neuroscience is shedding new light on the neural underpinnings of ... 
social processing, affective responses and their relation to learning. These new discoveries link body and 
mind, self and other ... They dissolve traditional boundaries between nature and nurture in development 
(Immordino-Yang, 2011 p.98). 
 
As we have seen, the disagreement between biology and sociology is not a new one – the 
conflict between nature and nurture demonstrate as much. This debate rooted in the natural 
and social science discourse can further be linked to the discourse of educational 
neuroscience. Interdiscoursive connections hold not only the same „gap‟; one has lately seen 
parallel upheavals at both levels – upheavals which, to some extent, abide similar positions, 
ideologies, and arguments. Old boundaries are questioned and voices „to bridge the gap‟ can 
be heard both in the underlying science-discourse and the discourse of educational 
neuroscience. Considering the rising inclination in academia to, once again, „bridge the gap‟, 
it is therefore of interesting to note that these bridging-projects are ventured by attempting to 
craft reciprocal collaborations between the different fields. On that note, and as Snow already 
argued back in 1959;   
 
All the arrows point the same way. Closing the gap between our cultures is a necessity in the most abstract 
intellectual sense, as well as in the most practical. When those two senses have grown apart, then no society 
is going to be able to think with wisdom (Snow, 1959 p.50). 
 
 
6. Discoursive change and scientific revolutions 
Thus far we have seen that the aim of educational neuroscience is to build a two-way 
collaboration between cognitive neuroscience on one side and education on the other. This 
link has met profound reluctance amongst some sceptics due to the disciplines‟ dissimilarities. 
Reluctance being uttered can further be related to „a peripheral gap‟ between neuroscience 
and education and „an underlying gap‟ between natural and social science. The discourse of 
educational neuroscience thus witness of a complex entanglement of structures, connections, 
and conflicts. What is more, these discoursive and interdiscoursive aspects can further be 
allied with another prominent discoursive element – the element of change. This chapter will 
elaborate upon the aspect of change found in educational neuroscience by drawing on Norman 
Faircloughs (1992) theories on discourse and social change, and Thomas Kuhns (1962) 
theories on scientific revolutions.  
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Hegemony, power and discoursive dominance 
A discourse is, according to Foucauldian theories, embedded with power-relations where 
different discoursive positions strive to attain hegemony, making their representation the 
representation of the world (Jäger & Maier, 2009). Discoursive power can further be linked 
with states of hegemony and dominant representations. “Discoursive power plays a crucial 
role in defining and maintaining certain representation within a given discourse” (ibid.). This 
ability to define which knowledge is valid at any given time is, according to Neumann (2001), 
the most significant prospect of power since it defines what is perceived as true and normal. 
These dominant representations and ideologies will furthermore shape out the discourse‟s 
boundaries (Fairclough, 1992). Kuhn (1962) entitles these boundaries „rules‟, and notes how 
these „established viewpoints‟ or „preconceptions‟ “limit both the nature of acceptable 
solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained” (p.38).  
 
On this note, numerous authors in the literature of critical discourse analysis have argued as 
regard the extent of determinism discoursive power executes over individuals. Althusser see 
people as passive subjects deprived of possibilities to ideological resistance and action 
(Jørgensen & Philips, 1999). Foucault (1970; 1972) and Fairclough (1992) on the other hand, 
and numerous authors with them (Jørgensen & Philips, 1999; Neumann, 2001; Jäger & Maier, 
2009), take another approach, claiming that one can oppose to powerful discoursive 
hegemonies, ideologies and representations. “The nature of conflicting elements holds the 
seed to resistance, since elements which challenge dominant representations provide people 
with resources to make resistance. Hegemony is therefore never stabile, but changing and 
unfinished” (Jørgensen & Philips, 1999 p.88 [my translation]). Resistance is possible – so is 
discoursive change. Given this to be true, how can discoursive resistance and change be 
linked to the discourse educational neuroscience?  
 
Analysing educational neuroscience by drawing on these critical discourse theories, aids 
elucidating certain aspects. What first can be noted is the hegemonic position „the social 
thought‟ seems to have held in sociological discourses over the last century. Degler (1991) 
demonstrated this „triumph of sociology‟, and notes how nurture has obtained supremacy over 
nature in sociology from the 1930s and onwards. Similar, Bergesen (2004) evinces how this 
„nurture‟ supremacy has influenced sociological and educational theories from Meads theory 
of symbolic interaction to Bourdieus concept of habitus. What this sociological hegemony 
secondly implies is that „the social thought‟ has held a significant amount of power within the 
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discourse of social science – a power which subsequently has enabled this hegemonic position 
to define and maintain specific ideologies, representations, knowledge and boundaries. Given 
what have been stated thus far, it is reason to assume that these ideologies and boundaries has 
been defined and drawn in favour of nurture over nature. This corresponds with the reluctance 
one can find towards biological explanations in sociology in general, and towards cognitive 
neuroscience in education in specific. With regard to this, one can therefore argue that the 
sociological thought thus far has held a profound hegemonic power, shaping and maintaining 
discoursive boundaries within social science. How then, does educational neuroscience fit into 
this picture, and how can this be linked to discoursive change? 
 
Discoursive change 
”It takes profound discoursive work to maintain things the way they are. To make the world 
appear as stabile when it actually is in constant change implies that the possessing of power 
involves the capability to freeze meaning” (Neumann, 2001 p.143). Subsequently, this entails 
that discoursive dominance can cease to exist; hegemonic power can falter and change can 
occur. In his book „Discourse and social change‟, Fairclough (1992) elaborates upon the 
timid line which easily can transfer hegemonic domination to discoursive change. One of the 
crucial factors which can tip the scale in one or the other direction – either towards 
continuance of hegemony or in favor of discoursive alteration – is voices of disagreement 
uttered against discoursive boundaries. “The immediate origins and motivations of change in 
the discoursive event lie in the problematization of conventions … Such problematizations 
have their bases in contradictions” (ibid. p.96). Fairclough elaborates further, and also clarify 
in more detail what discoursive change involves; 
 
Change involves forms of transgression, crossing boundaries, such as putting together existing conversion in 
new combinations, or drawing upon conventions in situations which usually preclude them … As producers 
and interpreters combine discursive conventions, codes and elements in new ways in innovatory discursive 
events, they are of course cumulatively producing structural changes in orders of discourse: they are 
disarticulating existing orders of discourse, and rearticulating new orders of discourse, new discoursive 
hegemonies. Such structural changes may affect only the „local‟ order of discourse of an institution, or they 
may transcend institutions and affect the societal order of discourse (ibid. p.96f). 
 
In other words; linking different discourses and crossing boundaries can create change. 
Further, changes in one discourse can affect other discourses. The interdiscoursive aspect is 
prominent in the process of change. Critical discourse analysis even stresses this by claiming 
that “high levels of interdiscoursive connections coincide with change, while few 
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interdiscoursive connections indicate reproduction of status quo” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999 
p.94). How do this relate to educational neuroscience? 
 
Interdiscoursive tangles in the discourse of educational neuroscience are eminent, and the 
problematization of discoursive boundaries even more so. Not only is the boundaries between 
education and neuroscience attempted crossed, also the more profound gap between social 
science and natural science – between nurture and nature – is questioned. Ansari, Coch and 
Smedt (2011) concluded their latest article exclaiming that “traditional academic boundaries 
need to be crossed and mutual respect developed” (p;41), Choudhury and colleagues (2009) 
state that we have to “break down the dichotomy between nature and culture” (p.71), whilst 
Immordino-Yang (2011) claims that new findings already have started to ”dissolve traditional 
boundaries between nature and nurture in development” (p.98). Their message is clear; old 
ideologies and boundaries must be challenged. The advocators for educational neuroscience 
do indeed call for change.  
 
Requests for change uttered amongst cautious optimists, corresponds with Hirschmans 
theories on personal discoursive strategies (Neumann, 2001). According to Hirschmans 
theory, advocates holding a „cautious optimism‟ appear to possess a course of action labeled 
„voice‟, as they oppose to their discourse‟s hegemonic representation and its boundaries. An 
expansion of this term, „des-identification‟, can additionally seem to fit (ibid.). This term 
stresses that individuals voicing their opposition to the discourse additionally creates 
something new. In this case, this „creating of something new‟, can be seen to be the discipline 
of educational neuroscience itself. Educational neuroscience can thus be perceived as an effect 
of discoursive and interdiscursive struggles, just as it can be seen as an arena of conflict.  
 
Scientific revolution 
Fairclough (1992) states that problematization of discoursive boundaries often generates 
discoursive change. However, Fairclough do not give considerably notion to the factors which 
usually generate this problematization in the first place. Kuhn (1962), on the other hand, 
elaborates upon this and states that “technology has often played a vital role in the emergence 
of new sciences” (p.16). Not only does innovative technology allow us to approach certain 
scientific aspects in different ways; they can conversely offer new methods, theories, and 
readjust knowledge. Old representations and ideologies held by the paradigm are therefore 
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likely to be challenge (ibid.). Drawing on notable scientific events in history, Kuhn (1962) 
elaborates as he demonstrates which factors are essential in scientific revolutions; 
 
…these display what all scientific revolutions are about. Each of them necessitated the community‟s 
rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a 
consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the 
profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. 
And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a 
transformation of the world within which scientific work was done. Such changes, together with the 
controversies that almost always accompany them, are the defining characteristics of scientific revolutions 
(p.6). 
 
Looking at the discourse of educational neuroscience, new technologies have played a vital 
role in its formation. fMRI, for instance, has made it possible to allocate structures and 
functions of the brain previously unknown for man. New scientific observable facts of the 
brain have further resulted in adjustments of old cognitive models of the mind. These 
alterations have affected well-acknowledged educational theories. In some circumstances, 
these alterations have even led to outcomes where old cognitive theories no longer correspond 
with new neuroscientific findings. (Howard-Jones, 2007). Consequently questions arise and 
profound academic debates are generated. This have, in turn, lead to the fusion of two 
scientific fields as a mean to find more adequate theories which can solve the questions the 
old educational theories now fail to answer.  
 
This domino reaction contains numerous of the factors mentioned in Kuhns (1962) chain of a 
scientific revolution – new technologies, rejection of old theories in favor of new and „better‟ 
ones, and a shift in how the scientific field understands it boundaries. However, to define 
educational neuroscience as a „scientific revolution‟ per se is a statement I will not craft in 
this thesis. This paper do neither hold the scope to adequately argue for such a statement, nor 
do I think one rightfully can call any event „a scientific revolution‟ (in Kuhns standard, at 
least) at such an early stage as the discipline of educational neuroscience now holds. As Kuhn 
(1962) himself states as regards scientific revolutions: “[it] is seldom completed by a single 
man and never overnight” (p.7). Nonetheless; claiming that this discipline possesses a 
significant position in what can become a scientific revolution, or even calling it a 
revolutionary discipline, are statements more readily defendable.  
 
Educational neurosciences‟ position as a revolutionary discipline has not slipped past the 
attention to numerous academic authors. Immordino-Yang (2011) notes that “the past decade 
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has seen major advances in cognitive, affective and social neuroscience that have the potential 
to revolutionize educational theories about learning” (p.98), whilst Ansari, Coch and 
DeSmedt (2011) frequently refer to educational neuroscience as a “revolution in education” 
(p.38). Kelly (2011) uses similar words, as she concludes:  
 
[W]e are beginning to see ... the basis for a revolution in theorizing about learning that designs and refines 
its measures, guides its hypotheses, informs its analyses and grounds its conclusions using data from 
cognitive neuroscience studies. I expect that current, apparently incommensurate, theories or general 
descriptions about learning will be decided more and more on the basis of this growing empirical record. 
Theories are never abandoned easily, of course, but the disambiguation of claims at the hypothesis testing 
level using cognitive neuroscience data is likely to place upward pressure on theories, which are too often 
contingent descriptions of learning with little specification of mechanism or grounding in the larger set of 
findings in science (p. 20).  
 
Critical discourse theories do state that problematization of discoursive boundaries and 
ideologies, is the first step towards discoursive change (Fairclough, 1992). Kuhn‟s (1962) 
theory on scientific revolutions also concurs with this, and additionally shapes out the 
structure of scientific revolutions. However, the event of change is one thing – the event of 
scientific revolution another. Changes are certainly taking place in the field of education due 
to commence of the novel discipline of educational neuroscience. How profound these 
changes will be, if it can be labelled a „scientific revolution‟, and which consequences this 
academic upheaval eventually will bring forth, are questions yet to be answered.  
 
 
7. The illusion of ‘a gap’ 
A critical analysis of the educational neuroscience discourse could have ended with what thus 
far have been examined: I have reviewed the core and aim of educational neuroscience, 
mapped out the different discoursive positions which can be allocated in the debate, and 
critically analysed discursive and interdiscoursive aspects such as hegemonic power, 
ideologies, conflicts, and discoursive change. All this are features of a discoursive structure 
which, to some extent, often remains imperceptible for subjects in a discourse and which, 
accordingly, are attempted illuminated by critical discourse analysis. As Fairclough evinces; 
“The point is to make visible through analysis, and to criticize, connections between 
properties of text and social processes and relations (ideologies, power relations) which are 
generally not obvious to people who produce and interpret those text, and whose effectiveness 
depend upon this opacity” (Fairclough in Neumann, 2001 p.97). Drawing on this, I have 
endeavored to clarify the discourse and the dilemmas of educational neuroscience. Constraints 
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as regards a master thesis scope and page-limitation imply that I ought to stop here; I am 
afraid I will not. There is another feature in the discourse of educational neuroscience which 
recently has caught my attention; a feature which can be suggestive of yet another 
imperceptible facet in the discourse. I cannot avert myself to accentuate this, and will thus 
continue with my analysis for just a few more pages.  
 
Talk of ‘the gap’ and building of ‘a bridge’ are prominent facets in the discourse of 
educational neuroscience. Already in 1997 Bruer, with his renowned article „Education and 
the brain: a bridge too far’, inspired this metaphor by claiming that educational neuroscience 
would fail in the task to connect education and neuroscience as it was “a bridge too far”. 
Ansari and Coch titled their article “Bridges over troubled waters” (2006), Varma and his 
colleagues (2008) look at the methodical, theoretical, and philosophical problems connected 
to „the gap‟, and numerous authors who hold a cautious optimism argue for „a two-way 
collaboration to bridge the gap between education and neuroscience‟(Geake, 2005; Goswami, 
2006; Campbell, 2011; Howard-Jones, 2011). The illustration of „a gap‟ is, furthermore, not 
restricted to the debate on educational neuroscience alone. Literature pertaining to natural and 
social science reveal a similar metaphor, similar boundaries, and analogous bridging problems 
(Degler, 1991; Choudhury et al, 2009; Immordino-Yang, 2011). Accordingly, I am inclined to 
deem that the linguistic metaphor of „a gap‟ in educational neuroscience can be an effect of 
interdiscoursive links to the similar metaphor of „a division‟ between natural and social 
science. This assumption is again drawing on Fairclough (1992) and his theory on inter-
discoursive relations, as structures in one discourse often affect discourses connected to it. 
 
Metaphors are not uncommon in discourses. On the contrary, metaphors are often used as to 
illustrate abstract problems and phenomena – an aid, of sort, to paint a picture of a fairly 
incomprehensible world. By painting representations with common and spatial metaphors, 
phenomenon becomes more vivid and comprehensible (Neumann, 2001). The problem, 
however, is that metaphors are not neutral. By representing the world with the use of 
metaphors, subjects in a discourse conversely have to abide and obey to them. “By choosing a 
set of metaphors as to illustrate certain phenomena, one re-present the phenomenon in a 
certain way” Neumann (2001) states, before continuing noting that “language is a facet of re-
presentation as it cannot be without meaning; language will, however, structure what is said, 
for instance by using the power embedded in metaphors” (p.41 [my translation]). Language 
creates discourses and discoursive boundaries, but discourses also create the language 
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(Jørgesen & Phillips, 1999). Language and discourses are thus embedded in one another; both 
holding a prominent notion of power as they structure what is and can be said.  
 
The relation between power and language in a discourse is intriguing, but individuals ought to 
be considered in this relationship too. Individuals do not necessarily take a passive role in this 
relationship, as people are well capable to intentionally use linguistic power as a means to an 
end (ibid.). In his theory on power, Steven Luke (1974) argues that one can identify three 
different power-relations. The most radical power-appliance is, in accordance to him, the one 
where „A‟ exerts power over „B‟ without „B‟ being aware of it (Luke in Neumann, 2001).  
Conscious use of language as to structure discoursive representations and „a truth‟, can 
witness of such a three-dimensional power exertion. I am, however, in doubt that the use of a 
gap-metaphor in the educational neuroscience discourse is done consciously by any group as 
to wield power. In fact, I am more of a mind to deem the metaphor of „a gap‟ in educational 
neuroscience as a four-dimensional power exertion. A four-dimensional power exertion is a 
concept postulated by Foucault, and can be seen as an extension of Lukes three-dimensional 
power model. In his theory, Foucault does not contradict the three different power-dimensions 
identified by Luke. He takes nonetheless a different approach. Where Luke claims that „A‟ 
can exert power over an unknowing „B‟, Foucault argues that sometimes not even „A‟ is 
aware of the structural bias its action is a part of (Foucault, in Neumann, 2001). “The order of 
things appears as normal and consequently remains relatively unchallenged for both „A‟ and 
„B‟. This normality affects the structure of action” (ibid. p.168). What this implies is that 
people sometime can abide by an „imperceptible power‟ – a power, that is, which is 
manifested and embedded in the discourse. There is neither a man nor a group of people who 
hold this supremacy; instead it is in the discourse itself. Discourses can, therefore, exert power 
over its individuals as it makes certain things appear as true and beyond all doubt, even if this 
is not necessarily so. These discoursive power-executions can furthermore impinge language, 
which again can affect the way people think, act and talk (Jørgesen & Phillips, 1999). 
 
What I insinuate, is that the metaphor of „a gap‟ can be suggestive of what Foucault entitles a 
„four-dimensional power exertion‟. People in the discourse can thus be likely to use this 
linguistic gap-metaphor unconsciously, as it appears to be a part of an accepted and 
unquestioned „order of things‟ (cf. Foucault, 1972).To strengthen my premise I will, once  
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again, confer on critical discourse analysis – this time on the note concerning repetition of 
statements. As Jäger and Maier (2009) affirm; 
 
[A] discourse, with its recurring contents, symbols and strategies, leads to the emergence and solidification 
of „knowledge‟ and therefore has sustained effects. What is important is not the single text ... but the 
constant repetition of statements (p.38). 
 
The continuous repetition of „a gap‟ – both between education and neuroscience, and between 
natural and social science – are in this respect of significant note. According to both Snow 
(1959) and Degler (1991), this „division‟ can be noted as far back as in the late 19th and early 
20
th
 century, when natural and social science started being perceived as opposites. The gap-
metaphor has, henceforth, frequently been exploited. This continuous echo of „a gap‟ can 
therefore indicate a deep-rooted linguistic structure which not only have been profoundly 
manifested in our discourses, the gap-metaphor also affect the way individuals in the 
discourse think, talk, and act (Jäger & Maier, 2009).  
 
As to demonstrate, and as to substantiate my impending point, let us briefly look back in 
history when the world „was‟ flat. This statement might craft some opponents – certainly the 
world was not flat. I beg to differ, claiming that for some cultures in the year 3000-1000 BC 
the world was indeed as flat as an ant just stepped on by elephants. The model of the Earth as 
a plane disk was for these ancient cultures an unquestionable and universal truth. How these 
cultures thought, acted, and talked was consequently structured in accordance to this 
representation. Why would it not? The sky was blue, oranges were round, and the Earth was 
flat. As long as individuals continued to perceive, talk, and act in accordance, these 
discoursive and linguistic structures were reinforced and the idea of the flat Earth maintained 
valid. A representation of a flat-planed Earth did not in itself craft any major problems; people 
thus continued with their lives, happily aware of the disk-shaped outline of the earth they 
were treading upon. Problems were, however, initiated when people started to question this 
model, claiming the Earth to be spherical. Statement of a spherical Earth did not affect 
everybody, though, as there certainly were those who could not have cared less if the world 
was shaped as a disc, a sphere, or like a squirrel for that matter. The same could not be said 
with regard to seafarers. For them the shape of the Earth was an essential matter – in fact, it 
was a matter of life and death. Insofar these seafarers had peacefully abided by „the order of 
the world‟; always making sure to keep an eye on the horizon as not to risk sailing over the 
edge of the Earth. A change of view thus crafted upheavals. Reluctance being uttered was 
probably not regarding the shape of the world itself; it was most likely due to the horrendous 
 55 
 
prospect this new representation held. In one moment one lived in a flat world; in the next 
people started questioning „the Earth‟ itself, hoisted their sails, and navigated straight into the 
infinite. Indubitably this created upheaval and reluctance. I cannot blame them; I would also 
be afraid falling over the brim of the world and into unknown vastness.  
 
The same goes to the discourse of educational neuroscience. The repetitively talk of a gap 
creates a gap. Subsequently, and inevitably, one can locate reluctance to cross this vastness 
on a rigidity bridge – trip and you might risk falling into infinite unknowingness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The point I am trying to make is that there is no gap. The metaphor of „a gap‟ is precisely just 
that – it is an allegory, a representation, an illusion. The world itself does not hold any 
boundaries; neither does it hold any categorizations, labels, or gaps. Talk of categorical 
dissimilarities between natural and social science is only an old way to structure the world as 
to make it more comprehensible. When one constantly uses the metaphor of „a gap‟ between, 
for instance, the discipline of education and neuroscience, this gap-illusion is reinforced. 
These linguistic and abstract representations are not pictures of the „real world‟ itself. 
Moreover, when our language constantly keeps emphasizing a divide one will, as Foucauldian 
discourse theories imply, persist in thinking, acting, and structuring the world in accordance 
to this representation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). As such, the linguistic gap-metaphor can 
be alleged to hold significant power. First of all does the metaphor of a gap „structure action‟, 
as Foucault say. This linguistic notion of a „divide‟ do secondly hold power as it, by and 
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large, is taken for granted as a natural order of the world. Thirdly, and following this, it can be 
noted that the gap-metaphor is relatively unchallenged
32
. Accordingly this entire state of 
affairs conveys the impression that individuals in the educational neuroscience discourse are 
affected by a four-dimensional power exertion – a power exertion which can, furthermore, be 
seen as interdiscoursive and linguistically linked with „the division‟ between natural and 
social science. Boundaries, categorisation, and gaps are therefore suggestive of discoursive 
illusions which, unfortunately, generate restriction of thought. It can, in other and cruder 
words, appear that individuals are so profoundly caught in this discourse, that they have 
become victims of their own illusions. 
 
By claiming that „there is no gap‟, I do not claim that there are no dissimilarities between 
education and neuroscience; or between natural science and social science for that matter. 
Certainly there are dissimilarities between these academic topics; had there not been, there 
would not have been any „disciplines‟ in the first place. One can find differences in theories, 
methods, and philosophies used by these different disciplines – almost every author in the 
educational neuroscience discourse concur on this point (Vama et al., 2008). Differences in 
method, theories, and philosophies notwithstanding; authors in the debate on educational 
neuroscience – regardless of their discoursive position – talk about a gap as if there actually is 
a clear division between education on one side and neuroscience on the other (or between 
natural and social science). The pessimistic sceptics claim that the differences are so profound 
that it is impossible to bridge the gap (ibid.). Misguided enthusiasts jump this gap in one eager 
leap, as they directly connect the two fields using „brain-based learning programs‟. Whilst 
optimist either take a hesitating position claiming one need to anchor the bridge using a 
middle ground such as cognitive psychology (Bruer, 1997), or by taking a more cautious 
approach calling forth a two-way collaboration as to bridge the gap (Howard-Jones, 2011). 
Regardless of their discoursive standpoint, numerous of these authors talk about a gap as if 
there actually is a gigantic gap dividing the scenery of science in two halves. This is, in my 
view, a severe fallacy as this illusory metaphor contributes to restrict how we think and act.  
 
My statement might be severe. I do indeed believe it to be accurate, albeit, some justification 
might be apposite so that my proclamation does not fall victim of misapprehensions. My 
                                                          
32
 This correspond with Neumann (2001) assertion that metaphors of the spatial often remain unchallenged. 
This claim of a relatively unchallenged gap-metaphor does not mean that ‘the gap’ itself remain unchallenged – 
the debate on educational neuroscience evinces as much. The metaphor of a gap, on the other hand, is more 
apt to continue shaping out the way we think, talk, and act without us questioning it. 
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argument must, first of all, not be interpreted as if I deem everyone trapped in a linguistic 
supremacy, where neither thought nor action can elude metaphorical gaps. My statement 
should secondly not be read along the lines that I exclusively disincline the use of 
categorisations and metaphors. In fact, I do believe that exploiting categorizations and 
metaphors as an aid to comprehend the complex world can be a necessity. One should, 
however, be aware that language holds power as it can limit and confine how we think and act 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). As Foucault (1972) notes;  
 
We must also question those divisions or groupings with which we have become so familiar. Can one 
accept, as such, the distinction between the major types of discourse, or that between such forms or genres 
as science, literature, philosophy, religion, history, fiction, etc., and which tend to create certain great 
historical individualities? ... [T]hese divisions – whether our own, or those contemporary with the discourse 
under examination – are always themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative 
rules, institutionalized types: they, in turn, are facts of discourse that deserve to be analysed beside others; 
of course, they also have complex relations with each other, but they are not intrinsic, autochthonous, and 
universally recognizable characteristics (p.24f). 
 
Categorizations, labels, and gaps are not universally characteristics. Moreover, language and 
its metaphors hold power as they contribute to shape a discourse. This does not necessarily 
imply that we should discard the categorizations we insofar have used. We should, on the 
other hand, bear this in mind so that we do not get trapped in our own linguistic illusions.  
 
[N]eed we dispense for ever with „æuvre‟, the book, or even such unities as „science‟ or „literature‟? Should 
we regard them as illusions, illegitimate constructions, or ill-acquired results? Should we never make use of 
them, even as a temporary support, and never provide them with a definition? What we must do, in fact, is 
to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence, and to free the problems that they pose; to recognize that 
they are not the tranquil locus on the basis of which other questions (concerning their structure, coherence, 
systematicity, transformations) may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster of questions 
(Foucault, 1972 p.28f). 
 
What then, does all of this imply? If my assumption as regards discoursive and linguistic 
power relation bears strains of accuracy in it, my premise can abet elucidating the discourse of 
educational neuroscience at another level. The educational neuroscientific debate evolving 
around „the problems of the gap‟ can thus not merely be seen as discoursive and 
interdiscoursive facets. The linguistic metaphor of a gap is, in itself, also entwined in this 
discoursive web. Not only can this be suggestive of an interdiscoursive and imperceptible 
illusion. The gap-metaphor do also exerts power as it contributes to shape out individuals‟ 
thoughts, knowledge, and acts. Different discoursive positions, ideologies, problematization  
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of boundaries, and the enterprise to „bridge the gap‟ are therefore not the only discoursive 
aspects essential in the discourse of educational neuroscience. Language is also an imperative 
discoursive facet, as language is a powerful tool in shaping our thoughts. 
 
Has not the practice of revolutionary discourse and scientific discourse over the past two hundred years 
freed you from this idea that words are wind, an external whisper, a beating of wings that one has difficulty 
in hearing in the serious matter of history? 
Michel Foucault 
 
 
8. A précis of the thesis with a note for the road ahead 
Will educational neuroscience become “just another fad, a footnote in the history of the 
movement towards research-based education”? (Ansari et al., 2011 p.38). An answer to this 
question lies in the future, and only time can reveal the fate of educational neuroscience as a 
discipline. There are, however, some aspects which ought to be stressed in this final summary 
– a reminder, of sort, for the road ahead. 
 
Over the last two decades we have witnessed significant accomplishment in the field of 
cognitive neuroscience, as new technologies have made it possible to scientifically observe 
structures and mechanism of the human brain. When long-hidden secrets on how the brain 
works are revealed, new understandings of the mind subsequently follow. These new 
cognitive theories do, furthermore, affect aspects relevant to education – aspects such as 
learning, thinking, and memorising (Howard-Jones, 2007). This alteration has accordingly, 
and inevitably, crafted a debate amongst educationists. Numerous academics claim that new 
findings of the brain should be taken into consideration in education – the majority of these 
optimists arguing for a transdisciplinary discipline labelled educational neuroscience (Varma 
et al, 2008). Others, on the other hand, are more reluctant. Not only do these sceptics censure 
misguided learning industries and their neuromyths; the sceptics are also reluctant to the very 
idea „to cross the gap‟ between education and neuroscience. This gap, or rather, these gaps are 
assumed to lie between education and cognitive neuroscience, e.g. problems of theoretical, 
methodological, and philosophical nature (ibid.), between theory and practice (Stein & 
Fischer, 2011), and between the social and individual mind/brain (Howard-Jones, 2007)
33
. 
Furthermore, problems have also been pointed out as regards reductionism. When 
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 Some of these gaps can be seen as overlapping, interwoven, or even as interdiscursive relatives.  
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collaboration between two different spheres is entered into, there is always a possibility that 
one „cannibalise‟ the other. Collaboration between education and neuroscience is no 
exception. Numerous educationists thus argue for a looming risk that education will fall under 
direct instructs from neuroscientists (Goswami, 2006). 
 
The notion of „a gap‟ – with the problems and possibilities a bridge might initiate – has 
become an eminent facet in the discourse of educational neuroscience. In this regard, it is also 
noteworthy that „the gap-problems‟ also is suggestive of interdiscoursive links drawn to the 
„division‟ between natural science and social science. This profound gap dividing „the two 
cultures‟ has crafted conflicts for decades, and differences in methods, theories, and 
philosophies are frequently pointed out. The outcome connotes an opposition between the two 
sciences, as generally neither of the two acknowledge the importance of the other (Snow, 
1959; Bergesen, 2004). Discoursive and interdiscoursive entanglements related to „the gap‟ 
are of essential note considering that the very core of educational neuroscience is to „bridge‟ 
this gulf (Campbell, 2011). What is striking, however, is that this gulf-metaphor seem 
impossible to elude. Snow (1959) and Degler (1991) note how the „division‟ between the two 
cultures have been an eminent element in the scenery of science since the twentieth century. 
The continuously repetition of the same „gap‟ in educational neuroscience, evinces the 
metaphors persistency. Drawing on critical discourse theories this enduring metaphor can, 
first of all, imply that the repeatedly statement of „a gap‟ contribute to manifest a gap-
representation in the discourse. Secondly, the profound representation of a gap can contribute 
to structure how individuals in the discourse think and act. As such, the powerful metaphor 
can convey the impression that this „division‟ is perceived as a natural and unquestionable 
truth. But is this so? Does ‟the gap‟ truly exist? There was no talk about such a division in 
science until the end of the Enlightenment (Snow, 1959). Can it thus be possible that we have 
overemphasised this division? Have we made the abstract metaphor of a gap become a 
concrete hindrance?  
 
The rigid divisions between disciplines, the lack of mutual comprehension, the misplaced feelings of 
superiority or disdain in different professional groups – these should be seen as problems, not fatalistically 
accepted as parts of the immutable order of things (Collini in Snow, 1959; 1963 p.lxi). 
 
Virtues of illusions notwithstanding; the idiom of „a gap‟ is eminent and it does hold power. 
Language represents the world; it makes certain facts become truths and it impinges how we 
think and act (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). What is important is that this metaphor and these 
categorisations do not become manifested as rigid truths as this can restrict our thoughts. 
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Claiming that a gap-metaphor might encumber how we think, does not imply that we ought to 
avoid such categories altogether. On the contrary; talk of „a divide‟ between natural and social 
sciences is a way to make known the fields‟ dissimilarities34. In accordance to numerous 
academics, this acknowledgement is of highly importance. Regardless of authors‟ scholastic 
background or nationality – whether the message come from a teacher, a cognitive science 
researcher, or a renowned educational professor; even if the message come from international 
political organizations – the requests seem to be the same: To reject the discipline of 
educational neuroscience due to potential problems, will imply turning one‟s back on 
significant possibilities which can aid improving education. Nonetheless; these problems 
cannot readily be dismissed and awareness of disciplinary dissimilarities of theoretical, 
methodological, and philosophical nature are apposite (Varma et al., 2008). It therefore 
appears that a common inclination is cautious optimism towards the discipline of educational 
neuroscience.  
 
Following this, and what is noteworthy in this respect, are the concluding messages to these 
cautious optimists. Two messages are particularly, and frequently, empathised. The first of 
these petitions is request for reciprocated collaboration between the discipline of education 
and the discipline of cognitive neuroscience. Educational neuroscience connects two 
academic spheres which for a long time have been seen as opposites. If this collaboration 
shall be proven successful, one sovereign cannot reduce the other under his power. What thus 
is needed is reciprocal partnership between the two. Equal partnership brings forth the second 
requisite; if one successfully wants to bridge „the gap‟ and create reciprocated collaboration 
between education and neuroscience, one ought to be aware disciplinary dissimilarities 
(Varma et al, 2008; OECD, 2007b). Lack of knowledge as regards differences between 
education and neuroscience can contribute to craft, spread, or apply misguided classroom 
formulas based on neuromyths – recent occurrences in education do, unfortunately, witness of 
such inopportunes
35
 (Goswami, 2006). To prevent too hasty drawn and erroneous mistakes 
these „divides‟ thus ought to be elaborated on.  
 
These requests are essential in themselves: awareness of disciplinary dissimilarities is 
important so that one successfully can achieve reciprocated collaboration between education 
                                                          
34
 These dissimilarities can also be seen as effects of discoursive structures manifested and sustained by 
language, since methods and theories are ‘representations’ themselves. I will, however, not draw my analysis 
too far along those lines, since one easily can get lost in epistemological socio-constructivisitc radicalism.   
35
 I.e. inconveniences crafted by so called ‘brain-based’ learning industries. 
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and cognitive neuroscience. This endeavour can further prevent reductionism of education in 
favour of neuroscience, in addition to avoid misguided neuromyths in classroom practice. 
Furthermore, involvement in this venture is also crucial as to prevent educational 
reductionism under political and economical standards. Geake (2005) stresses this by asking; 
“If educationists refuse to become involved in the cognitive neuroscientific enterprise could 
they find themselves even further marginalised than some politicians and education 
bureaucrats seem intent on pushing them?” (p.11).     
 
This is of importance, although I, as a Norwegian master student, cannot evade extract this 
message to another level: Norwegian educational values, traditions, and policies can also be 
reduced under international pressure. Prospects of international influence as regards 
educational neuroscience persuade are looming. Not only is the discipline relevant as regards 
eminent educational issues of theoretical, methodical, philosophical, and practical value; 
educational neuroscience is also of highly relevance to current political and societal concerns. 
Emphasis stressed by significant international organisations such as the OECD, also 
contribute to educational neuroscientific persuades (cf. Karlsen, 2006). I do not claim that 
Norwegian education is at danger for complete reduction. I do, however, point towards the 
luring probability of diminution – both as to neuroscientific instructs and to international 
educational and political standards. This can be unprofitable. I would therefore deem that it 
would be of most advantage if Norwegian educational academics – regardless of their 
standpoint towards this new discipline – get involved in the debate on educational 
neuroscience. Awareness, research, and participation in educational neuroscientific 
collaborations can emphasize national and educational traditions, values, and policies.This is 
crucial so that voices from Norwegian educationists do not get reduced to whispers in the 
international debate.  
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